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| Iraq |
| Our generals almost cost us Iraq |
| 2008-09-24 |
| By Mackubin Thomas Owens The dominant media storyline about the Iraq war holds that the decisions about how to conduct it pitted ignorant civilians -- especially the president and secretary of defense -- against the uniformed military, whose wise and sober advice was cavalierly ignored. The Bush administration's cardinal sin was interference in predominantly military affairs, starting with overruling the military on the size of the force that invaded Iraq in March 2003. But it's not just the media that peddles this story. As Bob Woodward illustrates in his new book, "The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008," it also resonates among many senior uniformed military officers. The plausibility of the narrative rests on two questionable principles. The first is that soldiers have the right to a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military instrument -- that indeed they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. The second is that the judgment of soldiers is inherently superior to that of civilians when it comes to military affairs. Both of these principles are at odds with the American practice of civil-military relations, and with the historical record. In our republic the uniformed military advises the civilian authorities, but has no right to insist that its views be adopted. Of course, uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if they think a policy is flawed. They must convey their concerns to civilian policy-makers forcefully and truthfully. But once a policy decision is made, soldiers are obligated to carry it out to the best of their ability, whether their advice is heeded or not. Moreover, even when it comes to strictly military affairs, soldiers are not necessarily more prescient than civilian policy makers. This is confirmed by the historical record. Historians have long recognized that Abraham Lincoln's judgment concerning the conduct of the Civil War was vastly superior to that of Gen. George McClellan. They have recognized that Gen. George C. Marshall, the greatest soldier-statesman since George Washington, was wrong to oppose arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940, and wrong to argue for a cross-channel invasion during the early years of World War II, before the U.S. was ready. Historians have pointed out that the U.S. operational approach that contributed to our defeat in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed military. And they have observed that the original -- unimaginative -- military plan for Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War was rejected by the civilian leadership, which ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative, and effective. So it was with Iraq. The fact is that the approach favored by the uniformed leadership was failing. As the insurgency metastasized in 2005, the military had three viable alternatives: continue offensive operations along the lines of those in Anbar province after Fallujah; adopt a counterinsurgency approach; or emphasize the training of Iraqi troops in order to transition to Iraqi control of military operations. Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George W. Casey, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq -- supported by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard Myers -- chose the third option. Transitioning to Iraqi control was a logical option for the long run. But it did little to solve the problem of the insurgency, which was generating sectarian violence. Based on the belief by many senior commanders, especially Gen. Abizaid, that U.S. troops were an "antibody" to Iraqi culture, the Americans consolidated their forces on large "forward operating bases," maintaining a presence only by means of motorized patrols that were particularly vulnerable to attacks by improvised explosive devices. They also conceded large swaths of territory and population alike to the insurgents. Violence spiked. In late 2006, President Bush, like President Lincoln in 1862, adopted a new approach to the war. He replaced the uniformed and civilian leaders who were adherents of the failed operational approach with others who shared his commitment to victory rather than "playing for a tie." In Gen. David Petraeus, Mr. Bush found his Ulysses Grant, to execute an operational approach based on sound counterinsurgency doctrine. This new approach has brought the U.S. to the brink of victory. Although the conventional narrative about the Iraq war is wrong, its persistence has contributed to the most serious crisis in civil-military relations since the Civil War. According to Mr. Woodward's account, the uniformed military not only opposed the surge, insisting that their advice be followed; it then subsequently worked to undermine the president once he decided on another strategy. In one respect, the actions taken by military opponents of the surge, e.g. "foot-dragging," "slow-rolling" and selective leaking are, unfortunately, all-too-characteristic of U.S. civil-military relations during the last decade and a half. But the picture Mr. Woodward draws is far more troubling. Even after the policy had been laid down, the bulk of the senior U.S. military leadership -- the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, the rest of the Joint Chiefs, and Gen. Abizaid's successor, Adm. William Fallon, actively worked against the implementation of the president's policy. If Mr. Woodward's account is true, it means that not since Gen. McClellan attempted to sabotage Lincoln's war policy in 1862 has the leadership of the U.S. military so blatantly attempted to undermine a president in the pursuit of his constitutional authority. It should be obvious that such active opposition to a president's policy poses a threat to the health of the civil-military balance in a republic. Mr. Owens is a professor at the Naval War College and editor of Orbis, the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. |
| Posted by:ryuge |
| #20 Grant was one of the few Union generals to realize that the way to win was to force the Confederates, and Lee, especially, to fight (and in the process to blood the Union troops, pin the Confederates in place, and wear them away). At one point during the Wilderness Campaign, Grant kept the Confederates pressed and engaged somewhere along the lines for more than 30 days straight. Grant's subordinates were afraid Grant was going to break the army by using it so roughly, but Grant pressed ahead and broke the Confederates instead although it may have been a near thing. Even following the Wilderness Campaign there was still fight in the Confederate army although they were forced o fall back on Petersburg where Grant probably made a strategic mistake and set in a long seige that probably prolonged the war unnecessarily. Grant's characteristic aggressiveness seems to have been conspicuously absent during the whole Petersburg seige. |
| Posted by: FOTSGreg 2008-09-24 23:36 |
| #19 The Generals wanted to avoid wearing the military down to the point of breaking (which could easily happen due to frequent troop rotations). THey probably hoped the administration would increase the numbers in the military to make this possible with the surge. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-09-24 15:29 |
| #18 Both. Shiloh, Vicksburg. Hammer, Anvil. Sherman, Grant. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-09-24 14:13 |
| #17 In keeping with the Burg theme of Fair & Balanced, the following copied from a mossy memorial in the middle of a courtyard in old Charleston. Co. A, Hampton Legion Inf’try And she points with tremulous hand below To the wasted and worn array Of the heroes who strove in the morning glow of the grandeur that crowned – the Gray Alas for the broken and battered hosts Frail wrecks from a gory sea Tho’ pale as a band in the realm of ghosts Salute them they fought with LEE. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2008-09-24 14:11 |
| #16 BTW -- Sherman was the one that persuaded Grant to stay on w/the Army. When Grant tookover as head commander he told Sherman to quit worrying about where the confederates were - just get after them. In Grant, Lincoln finally had a guy who knew how to win. Grant in some ways was like Washington -- he traded some tactical losses for strategic victories. Lee was more hannibalesque -- he knew how to win tactical victories and even some campaigns but couldn't get the strategic level taken care of. Although, much of that had to do w/his senior leaders like Jeff Davis. |
| Posted by: Broadhead6 2008-09-24 14:11 |
| #15 JFM - Grant supported Sherman not just w/men but w/the whole march to the sea plan as well as politically, Sherman answered to Grant in the chain of command. They were close friends and both Ohioans. In actuality, Grant & Sherman both had some affinity for the south - Sherman was head master at LSU (IIRC) and Grant had served w/many southern generals (Longstreet was still a friend of his & a strong supporter after the CW) during the Mex/Amer war in 1847. He and WTS wanted to make the war so awful that it ended sooner and would actually cause less suffering in the long run for the south. Grant's wife Julia Dent actually owned slaves when they first married. Grant even owned one for a short period. |
| Posted by: Broadhead6 2008-09-24 14:06 |
| #14 As an addendum, Atlanta has yet to recover. The city is still occupied by liberal democrats from the North. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2008-09-24 12:35 |
| #13 Without Grant, Sherman would not have had the support to execute his version of total war through Georgia & the carolinas. Sheramn commanded only one army. Of course he needed other armies for holding other parts of the front. Argument was about which one was really, really good versus which one was just quite good (but still a luminary compared to other Union generals). But the taking of Atlant was not merely a crushing blow for the CSA, it impeded a Copperhead victory in the elections. Also before Sherman, again and again Union Generals had had to withdraw when Southerner activity at their backs thretened their supplies. Instead Sherman marched to the sea and broke Confederation's back once and for all. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-09-24 12:27 |
| #12 To impose a MacArthuresque peace upon Iraq we would have had to impose a Japanese level defeat upon them. The politician chose not to. That was a political decision. The next war may perhaps result in a victory sufficient to impose such a peace. But it will be a horrid war for which few have the stomach, even after the murder of 3,000 innocents and the incineration of $1 Trillion, less than the Paulson package. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-09-24 11:39 |
| #11 Without Grant, Sherman would not have had the support to execute his version of total war through Georgia & the carolinas. |
| Posted by: Broadhead6 2008-09-24 11:34 |
| #10 I disagree with the whole axiom, that at any point it was "Bush vs. Generals". That is, both deserve credit for what went right, and blame for what didn't, in equal measure. What I consider our greatest problems were essentially "philosophical" ones, now very evident in retrospect. Importantly, they were *not* errors of bad faith or duplicity, just incorrect assumptions. To start with, it can be demonstrated that every part of their government we tried to preserve and reform was a mistake; but the vast majority that we recreated from scratch worked. They had no, zero, functional government left. So from the very beginning we should have imposed a MacArthur (PBUH) constitution on them. We should have had an American occupation government of Iraq, with J. Paul Bremer as chief executive over the rest of the government run by Americans. The first order of business should have been a complete census and registration of all citizens, who would be issued picture IDs with all information, including their name, encrypted in data matrix bar code. Anyone detained without ID would automatically be held until they could be entered into the US military held database, and longer, if suspected of illegal activities. This would have made government much easier. All Mosque sermons would have to be pre-approved by the provisional government. All media would be under the editorial discretion of the government as well. A US military court system would be established as the judiciary, which would try and imprison those engaged in criminal acts. At a date certain, this court system would be replaced by a US provisional government court system. When an Iraqi government had been appointed, this court would then issue death sentences for murderous acts then deemed criminal, again, after a date certain. Liberally hanging offenders. These US provisional courts should have been ordered based on Common Law legal principles, and Iraqis would be trained as attorneys who would then prosecute and defend Iraqis and others accused of crimes. Iraqi police forces should have been started from the ground up as well, but organized as a national police force. Military and police service would be by draft, and both military and police would be restricted to rural training camps. Unless they were without family, the US would deliver their entire paycheck to their family. Any unemployed male would be drafted. If unsuitable for military or police service, they would be put in work battalions and set to repair and improve infrastructure around the country. Any healthy unemployed male would be detained until assignment. The first Iraqi parliament would be composed almost entirely of women. No burqas, only head scarfs. Each woman would be trained in parliamentary procedure, and their decisions in consultation with the provisional government would be enforced by the provisional government. For a minimum of 20 years, the constitution would require that 50% of the parliament would be female. Again, these things in addition to the good stuff the military and the administration did, would have settled Iraq down much faster. An iron fist, early on, does much to restore order. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2008-09-24 11:34 |
| #9 From the learned cmts of Procopius2k... When avoiding defeat becomes more important than winning, when avoiding casualties becomes primary, you have entered the political game. Might I add, averting attainable and total VICTORY in battle by "avoiding" enemy casualties and the death of non-combatants. The haunting downside of premature diplomatic efforts and surgical tactics. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2008-09-24 11:22 |
| #8 Oh, yeah. Him. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-09-24 11:18 |
| #7 War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. Karl Von Clausewitz |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2008-09-24 11:16 |
| #6 regardless of the military's desire to be 'apolitical', it can not be. Didn't someone once say war was a continuation of politics by other means? What the American military has done is try to make military action a technical activity in which amateurs cannot interfere. The chickens are coming home to roost; and not just for the Army. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-09-24 11:13 |
| #5 Both. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-09-24 11:10 |
| #4 Final responsibility for success or failure rests at the top, with POTUS and his SECDEF. However a President the ability of a President to force its policies on reluctant geneerals or fire backstabbing ones depends onb its political position since such actions have a political cost, and that costs is much greater when the rpress is trying to distort everything you do. In 2006, Bush had few political hit points left and that is why generals could get away with disobeying direct orders and Congress on encroaching on President's powers in violation of teh Constitution. Oh, and BTW it was not Grant but Sherman who was decisive on winning the Civil War. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-09-24 10:40 |
| #3 There are two problems inherit in the American military structure. One procedural and the other is institutional. The American military spends most of its existence since Vietnam in 'peacetime'. You can not find battlefield leaders in peacetime. So, the military adopts 'good practices' of business and industry, setting up a structured progression career system to get competent people to the top based upon management of assets and people. Such skills are important for the day to day operation of a major organization where the environment permits. However, it can not definitively identify combat leaders. It can identify people with leadership traits, but no more than one would find at any of the major corporations or similar organizations elsewhere in society. The battlefield is far more a Darwinian environment than business in that the price you pay is final. Friendly and hostile takeovers don't carry the penalty in corporate America that they do in war. Fail in business and there are always opportunities to do something else in life. Fail on the battlefield and only those who escape may see another day. While many competent managers were sent into this conflict, there have been far fewer leaders. Unfortunately, by year two it was obvious that the peacetime 'personnel system' was paramount to operations rather than a wartime system of quickly identifying competent combat leaders and jumping the 'check the box' career programs. The personnel programs should have been realign to support those individuals who demonstrated what the institution existed for, that is 'the conduct of war'. Successful battalion and brigade commanders should have been promoted quickly and above their year group peers, not by another rank, but several. Our military is not lacking sufficient managers to assist and support those leaders, so specific experience in select skills is not wanting and does not require box checking. Fairness is not a military principle and, while some will have the opportunity to shine and other never get an opportunity at the same chance, has no play in war. Winning is primary. Second, regardless of the military's desire to be 'apolitical', it can not be. In trying to play the game, to retain support by keeping casualties down, in the end only plays in the political arena. When avoiding defeat becomes more important than winning, when avoiding casualties becomes primary, you have entered the political game. You are responding to the political by your actions and in doing so have become political. You will either become a pawn of one side or the target of another. Its disingenuous to claim that you are being non-partisan. You are not allowed to be so in the 'great game' no matter how distasteful it may seem. If you can not carry out the objectives of the Executive, then it is the responsibility of any senior, or for that matter junior, officer to resign your commission. Waiting till retirement or completion of contract and then 'bravely' denouncing the policies and procedures only shows you lack conviction of principles other than the pay and position you received. Going back to the first paragraph, there is a great difference between "We can not win" and "I can not win". Make room for those who can. Or as we'd say - lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way. |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2008-09-24 09:24 |
| #2 Final responsibility for success or failure rests at the top, with POTUS and his SECDEF. That responsibility includes making sure command guidance is accurately and expeditiously followed. Subordinates are replaced or moved along as necessary but never blamed. A soldier does best what his sergeant checks often. This old axiom applies at levels of leadership. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2008-09-24 07:37 |
| #1 Yea, yea very nice story: except we've seen George/Condi team in action in other areas---where they cannot pin blame on others. |
| Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2008-09-24 06:45 |