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| Afghanistan |
| Afghanistan is Not Iraq: Reasons to Be Wary of Another Surge |
| 2008-07-28 |
| After a brazen Taliban attack killed nine U.S. soldiers in a remote outpost in Afghanistan on July 13, Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan. Sen. Obama's trip to Afghanistan and Iraq has further focused attention on the vast disparity in U.S. resources going to the two wars. Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security. But we should remain wary of promises to apply an Iraq-style surge to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is even more complex than Iraq, and given complicating factors such as the presence of al-Qaida senior leadership, global narco-trafficking, and Pakistani nuclear weapons, the stakes in Afghanistan are higher. The challenge in Afghanistan differs from that in Iraq in several critical ways that raise questions about what a military surge alone can accomplish. First, porous borders are a much bigger problem in Afghanistan. While Iraqi and coalition forces face extremist infiltration from Iran and Syria, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces face a more daunting 1,640-mile ungoverned border with Pakistan. This line is recognized and sparsely defended by government forces but ignored by Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. The result is a battlefield where the enemy has ready sanctuary from which to stage attacks. How will additional U.S. forces fare any better without either a new partnership with Pakistan on border security or rules that allow counterinsurgency efforts reach across the border into Pakistan? Second, having a real coalition in Afghanistan brings real complications. In contrast to being relatively alone and in charge of the mission in Iraq, in Afghanistan the U.S. is both blessed and cursed by the support of over 40 partner countries and countless NGOs, all with their own strategies. How can a change in American military strategy overcome the command split between NATO and the United States and help coordinate dozens of independent actors? Third, the extremists in Afghanistan have a different resource base: heroin. Oil fuels some insurgent capabilities in Iraq, but it cannot be compared to the challenge of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Over 90 percent of the world's heroin now originates in the most lawless Afghan regions, funding the recruitment, training, and deployment of insurgents and terrorists. But the poppy also supports local economies for average Afghans, putting the coalition in a quandary: tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox? Finally, although Iraq is ailing and damaged, it has modern infrastructure and a history of central control that is alien to the Afghan and Pakistani tribal areas in which the current conflict is concentrated. How would more U.S. forces helping to extend central government control in Afghanistan be more than a band aid? None of these questions are answered, but it is clear that a surge in U.S. military capabilities can only be effective if complemented by several other steps. The most important are increased civilian reconstruction capabilities and well-funded, long-term training and mentoring of the Afghan military and police. These are the kind of measures that the U.S. could not muster for the surge in Iraq, and yet they are far more important in Afghanistan where the existing systems are so much weaker. Many of the steps taken under the leadership of Gen. Petraeus in Iraq do have relevance for Afghanistan. Chief among these would be a focus on population security that involves U.S., NATO and Afghan soldiers and civilians living in district centers and villages with the people under threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida. Second is a willingness to engage with the very tribes and clans that may have been shooting at allied forces the previous day. The coalition will continue to find local allies if our commitment is to be seen as credible and enduring. Afghanistan is in trouble but far from lost. Less than one-third of the country is really unstable and only about 10 percent of Afghan districts are under significant Taliban sway. But a surge of all types of effort -- military and civilian -- is needed to turn the tide. The mini-surge of 3,000 marines into the south and east of the country will soon draw to close after some success clearing insurgents, but the U.S. and its allies have little ability to hold and build those areas without capable Afghan security forces and Afghan and international civilians. U.S. forces should only surge into Afghanistan with a workable and comprehensive strategy and the right civilian counterparts. The renewal of interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a real opportunity. The presidential candidates -- or indeed President Bush in his remaining months -- should craft a strategy that ensures money and personnel for a civilian and military surge tailored to Afghanistan. Vikram Singh is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former Pentagon official. |
| Posted by:tu3031 |
| #15 ed: Ironically, Waziri and Pashto terrorists who never heard of a cell phone prior to NATO's action in Afghanistan, now use these to advance terror. Pakistan has a revenue redistribution scheme, wherein the province's get fixed percentages of federal funds, including US aid. Paradoxically, US money is being used to murder American soldiers. Combine that with the Pashto Heroin monopoly, and a dangerous prosperity is flourishing in areas that should look like the Moon. Senator McCain took the high road in the Schmidt Commission process, into US military regulation in the Afghanistan field. He needs to campaign for rationalization of the entire scope of strategies and tactics in that GWOT front. The GOP has to offer something other than the status quo. The 9% bump that Obama gathered after his voyage of ignorance, manifests public interest in workable change. The Afghan status quo is not working; that status quo cannot be made to work. |
| Posted by: McZoid 2008-07-28 19:58 |
| #14 The "Strongman" policy wherein US supported repressive regimes as long as they weren't too klepto and served US interests, was terminated by the Carter administration. Democracy isn't the solution in Central Asia. Afghan electors don't vote on merit; their votes are directed by War Lords and Clerics. In that context, Strongman rule would be better for them and the US. There is some evidence that the Northern Alliance wanted to execute those captured Taliban that the Tajiks, Russians, Uzbeks, and Americans wouldn't pay for. Scorched earth tactis - however brutal - worked in the North; they could be tried in the south. |
| Posted by: McZoid 2008-07-28 19:48 |
| #13 A surge will pump billions more into the Pakistan's economy who will then divert 10% to raise a new crop of jihadis. |
| Posted by: ed 2008-07-28 18:46 |
| #12 A leftist told me a few months ago that Americans had had to run out of Vietnam. If americans leave and/or if the governement left behind is ousted (eg Afghanistan where it was Dostom, switching sides who tumbled the pro-Soviet government) jihadis will spin it as a victory. And it will do wonders for their recruitment and for the emergence of new bin Ladens. Also, we would have a lot more people on our side, including informants if everyone didn't remember the helicopters in American mebassy in Saigon. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-07-28 16:52 |
| #11 Our major weakness is those on our side who are tooting for the enemy. Maybe instead of the relevant 19th century reference I should give the less relevant 20th century reference of no Dien Bien Phu. That's a defeat, not leaving. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-07-28 15:21 |
| #10 Our major weakness in the XOT is that people think that time plays for the jiahadis, that one day we will tire and that it will eb American helicopters over the roof of American embassy in Kabul. With those left behind being sadistically murdered like jihados have ever done. That is why people far to collabirate with Amdericans and that jihadis get new recruits. Becauise Jihad nurtures itself of successes. And their "victory" against teh Soviet Union (never mind that 90% of the work was done by Massoud and Ismael Khan who were not Taliban) was seen as amjor success for jihad. One, so big that theu thought they could tackle the other superpower. Give tham a victoty in Afghanistan and they will think they can tackle not only America but the world. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-07-28 14:55 |
| #9 The difference between leaving and retreating is negligible to the Jihadist propaganda machine. That is something we need to consider. Having said that, Pashtun's fight with everyone. We need to find a way to fight Pashtun's that support Al Queda and not Pashtun's that just want to kill their neighbors, or the government, or whomever. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-07-28 14:22 |
| #8 Don't retreat. Leave. Elphinstone retreated. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-07-28 12:51 |
| #7 In exactly what way is Afghanistan central to US security? Because it is crucial to win the propaganda war and you would handle a big victory to jihadis if we retreat from Afganistan. Say a Gettisburg in the WOT. Because for reaspons I have exposed several times it is crucialm to make Pakistan implode and the best instrument for this Pakistani Pashtuns (who have been radicalized by the Punjabis) wanting to leave Pakistan and return to their real country: Afganistan. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-07-28 12:20 |
| #6 Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan. The real difference is that McCain will listen to the Generals and take their advice, Obama will probably try to run the war himself since he is soooo smart. That's the real danger, not the taliwhackers, but Obama. |
| Posted by: bigjim-ky 2008-07-28 12:07 |
| #5 Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security. Let's examine this assumption. In exactly what way is Afghanistan central to US security? I'll be damned if I can think of one. It is difficult to think of a more godforsaken place on earth so bereft of economic, cultural, military, or political power. We've kicked out the Taliban. We've demonstrated to some outstanding natural warriors what professionally trained warriors can do. We should tell them that if they entertain the likes of the Taliban and al Qaeda again, we'll be back. But not as nicely. And then leave. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-07-28 11:43 |
| #4 I more or less agree. Afghanistan should be left to Afghans. Let Pashtun fight Pashtun while we make sure the other tribes and the border are secure and the poppy fields are destroyed. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-07-28 11:29 |
| #3 Make sure the farmers have something else to grow that is profitable and they are protected from the drug lords while doing it. Then we have a workable chance of pulling off a nice nation building exercise. Otherwise we are spinning our wheels. |
| Posted by: DarthVader 2008-07-28 11:20 |
| #2 "tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox?" Easy. Eradicate poppies with defoliants, pay off the willing farmers, and use increased troop levels to kill the ones that join the taliban and rebel (and burn their farms and bulldoze their houses when we kill them in combat against the troops there). Dead rebels don't do well farming poppies, other than as fertilizer. |
| Posted by: OldSpook 2008-07-28 10:17 |
| #1 We cannot solve Afghanistan without solving the issues in the tribal border areas of Pakistan, and in eliminating opium in Afghanistan. |
| Posted by: OldSpook 2008-07-28 10:14 |