| Submit your comments on this article |
| India-Pakistan |
| India's flawed policies made Nepal Maoist takeover possible |
| 2008-04-19 |
| By S Chandrasekharan, Director, South Asia Analysis Group The implications of having a rogue Communist state as a neighbour are yet to be understood by most people in India. The slow but sure steps that Prachanda would take to consolidate his hold might even kid some in Delhi into believing that perhaps the Maoists are not that bad. The results of the Constituent Assembly election have surprised everybody. But it appears to me that the Maoists pushed for the poll only when they were confident of making a dent in the Terai region. They may have foreseen the fall of the Nepali Congress (NC) as its influence in the region was on the wane and the local, Terain parties were divided. The Maoists hoped to capitalise on the fractured Opposition and their gamble paid off. By facilitating the 12-point agreement on November 22, 2005, India had consciously dumped its well-known policy of recognising the constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy as the twin pillars of Nepalese life. Thus, the path to converting Nepal into a "red" state had been consciously paved by New Delhi. After that it was clear to most people that it was no longer a question of whether or not the Maoists would take over Nepal one day, but whether India is preparing to manage the implications of a Maoist Nepal as its neighbour. One may question the methods of intimidation and threats that Prachanda had induced among the people in the run up to the election, but nothing succeeds like success. The Election Commission was too weak to prevent the rampaging Young Communist League (YCL) cadre. Prime Minister GP Koirala had become a toady of the Maoists a long time ago. The Home Minister, too, harboured a soft corner for them. In short, nothing could have stopped CPN (M) from winning. Results of 224 of the 240 seats under the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system show that the Maoists have won 119 seats. The NC is a distant second, with only 34 seats. But despite being the single biggest party, the Maoists won't enjoy a clear majority, which is essential if they wish to put their distinctive stamp on the new Constitution. There are 601 seats in all, and the Maoists would eventually have about 32 per cent of the seats under the Provisional Representation (PR) system. The leaders of the NC have only themselves to blame for the Maoists' victory and their party's decimation. They had been quite disconnected from their constituents ever since the "people's war" of 1996. Even some of their district committee meetings were held in Kathmandu as most of them had concentrated in the valley. A typical example is Mr Sushil Koirala who rarely visited Nepalgunj, his traditional constituency. People there naturally showed him the door. A counter example is Mr Bimalendhu Nidhi who maintained contact with his constituency patiently built up by his father and won despite the Terai unrest and the aggressive campaigning by the Maoists. Their failure to engage the armed groups in Terai for a dialogue till the end was another reason. Had they struck an agreement, then many of their committed voters in Terai would have had the courage to vote for them. But in the absence of such an arrangement, very few people braved the threats of the Maoists. It cannot be denied that there was a surge in favour of the Maoists. To a large extent the people voted for them out of a fear of reprisals because, after losing, the Maoists could have reverted to their guerrilla tactics. But, what about the future? As the final picture becomes clearer and clearer, it looks as if the Maoists would try to woo other parties for their support. The cooperation of other parties would be required for arriving at a broad consensus on the future constitutional structure. The Maoists may continue with the coalition as long as it suits them. Their objective is to consolidate their grip over the polity. The mainstream political parties have admitted that they are no match for the politico-military organisation of the Maoists. If the Maoists are sincere in joining the political mainstream, they should first dismantle the parallel administration they are still having in most of the districts other than the urban centres. Seized properties in many cases are yet to be returned. The attitude of the victorious Maoists towards the Army of Nepal is to be watched. The Maoists have demanded that their "PLA" should be integrated with the Army, but the armed forces chief of the country has rejected the suggestion. How Prachanda performs the delicate balancing act remains to be seen.The more difficult, but immediate imperative, is to rein in the YCL, which has grown into a lawless and violent behemoth. Prachanda is once reported to have said that he had continued to have the YCL that has grown into over 50,000 cadres to prevent any take over by the monarchist forces. It remains to be seen whether he honours his word. On external relations, any prognosis now would constitute speculation. No doubt India has welcomed the victory of the Maoists and the Foreign Secretary has declared that India is willing to work with anyone coming to power including the Maoists. On their part, the Maoists, too, have made some constructive statements. One immediate fallout will be an attempt to repeat people's war in southern Bhutan for which there are many indications. It would need all diplomatic efforts on the part of India to ensure that this does not happen. |
| Posted by:john frum |