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India-Pakistan
Over to the other general
2007-12-28
By K.P. NAYAR

With Benazir BhuttoÂ’s assassination, it no longer matters if General Pervez Musharraf remains PakistanÂ’s President.

With the huge political vacuum created by the passing away of PakistanÂ’s tallest leader, power has effectively passed on to General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, who can no longer remain in the shadow of the man whom he succeeded as the chief of army staff only a few weeks ago.

All of MusharrafÂ’s antics since September 11, 2001, have had the single purpose of perpetuating his rule in Pakistan.

On Thursday, a greater institutional responsibility fell on KianiÂ’s shoulders: that of preserving the armyÂ’s supreme role in PakistanÂ’s politics as that countryÂ’s only remaining institution with any degree of stability.

Every corps commander in Pakistan will have one thought uppermost in his mind tonight. How could this assassination have happened in Rawalpindi, the seat of the Pakistani army’s General Headquarters (GHQ), the sanctum sanctorum of the Pakistani “establishment” for at least half a century?

In November, Benazir wanted to hold a rally in Rawalpindi similar to the one at which she met her tragic end today. But Benazir was persuaded by the army brass to abandon the idea. That persuasion was a reflection of the armyÂ’s determination to insulate its GHQ from the tumult of Pakistani politics and retain its image as the countryÂ’s ultimate stabilising force.

BenazirÂ’s acquiescence in that effort reflected her new willingness to accommodate the army in her political calculations.

Kiani will attempt in the coming weeks to restore that balance in the body politic of Pakistan. But he can only do that now, if at all, by distancing himself from Musharraf.

It is the supreme irony of Pakistan that every President — or Prime Minister — who has appointed a new chief of army staff has miscalculated in his choice. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chose General Zia-ul Haq because he thought Zia was a mouse among the lions and would pose no threat to him. Zia literally devoured Bhutto, ousting him from power and then executing him.

Nawaz Sharif made the same mistake in choosing Musharraf to head the GHQ. Sharif was overthrown, but he escaped with his life, thanks to the US President and the king of Saudi Arabia.

In the coming months — earlier, if Musharraf’s stars are crossed — it will be the incumbent President’s turn to regret his choice.

Kiani is unique as the army chief: he is the only general who headed the scheming, conspiratorial, secretive Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to have risen to the very top of the armyÂ’s ladder. He will want to retain the confidence of the ISI, with its fingers in multiple pies, and preserve the armyÂ’s overarching role within the Pakistani state at the same time.

That now requires considerable tight-rope walking, for which Musharraf is a liability.

When Kiani and Musharraf looked each other in the eye at the emotional ceremony at which the army chiefÂ’s baton changed hands a few weeks ago, they would have recognised the value of their compact.

Kiani could never have hoped for a better President, one from his own ranks who would indulge the army and vice versa. That compact made it irrelevant who became Prime Minister after the January 8 election.

With Benazir gone, that compact lies in ruins. And Musharraf does not have the political capital to ressurect or refashion it any more.

Washington is one capital where this new weakness in Islamabad is unmistakably recognised. On Thursday morning when US President George W. Bush, on holiday at his ranch at Crawford was alerted to the developments in Pakistan, the Americans were initially at a loss. White House spokesman Scott Stanzel could not even bring himself to name Benazir lest it “undermine(d) reconciliation” — as the state department described today’s events at the same time — because Benazir’s assassination has abruptly ended the version of democracy carefully choreographed in London and Washington with the dead People’s Party leader as a key player.

Nawaz Sharif, the only other tall leader in Pakistan, rejected the idea of reconciliation and formation of a national government even before BenazirÂ’s body was moved from the hospital.

Kiani may yet be able to make Sharif change his mind but only if Musharraf leaves the political scene for good.

PakistanÂ’s army has normally stepped aside when the streets are in flames. That was how Zulifqar Ali Bhutto assumed power. His daughter similarly came to power when the army gave way after ZiaÂ’s death.

Kiani may choose to repeat history by brokering yet another compromise in PakistanÂ’s chequered politics that retains the quiet dominance of the army GHQ over the country.

As the late BenazirÂ’s military secretary in 1988, who met her in Dubai and London during her exile, he has enough strings to pull within her PeopleÂ’s Party,which is bereft of a second rung leadership. That makes Kiani the man to watch in the weeks and months to come.
Posted by:john frum

#3  The biggist deal in this whole Pakistan affair is to secure their nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and key components, like triggers. If we could do that, even with allies that we do not especially care for, like the Russians, or India, we could let Pakistan head into anarchy and burn itself out.

I do not care much about Pakistan. They are an extremely divided society caused by their own doing. I hope that they get things sorted out in a positive way.

I do care about their nuclear weapons, and I would like to see that threat to civilization solved. Done.
Posted by: Alaska Paul   2007-12-28 18:29  

#2  Which might be the best thing in the long run. The Baluchis would have a state that might be economically viable, the Pasthtuns could be walled off, and the rest of Pakistan would be a smaller, more homogenous state that might (because of its size) have no choice but to settle with the Indians and live in (relative) peace.

Of course, the short run to get there could be especially frightening.
Posted by: Steve White   2007-12-28 12:43  

#1  On the other hand, the place may just go up in flames and break into its costituent ethnic pieces.
Posted by: g(r)omgoru   2007-12-28 05:54  

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