Fierce fighting broke out in the central Baghdad district of Haifa Street on Tuesday as US and Iraqi forces moved in against insurgents, in an area once viewed as a showcase for the ability to control Baghdad neighbourhoods, by “saturating” them with military forces. The battles, in which US and Iraqi ground forces were supported by helicopters and fighter jets, reportedly left at least 50 insurgents dead, and came hours before George W. Bush, US president, was set to announce a plan for Iraq that is expected to feature a “surge” of as many as 20,000 new US troops. The district, a primarily Sunni Arab area that is virtually adjacent to the heavily fortified Green Zone, was a base for insurgents until a series of operations in early 2005, after which US troops withdrew and Iraqis took the lead in patrolling it.
The scale of TuesdayÂ’s fighting suggests that Sunni militants were able to move into the district again in force. It typifies the shifting nature of the insurgent presence in Sunni communities, in which guerrillas are driven out as US force levels go up and return as force levels fall, and leaves open the question of what a short-term increase in the number of US troops in Iraq can accomplish. Increased troop concentrations mean more patrols to disrupt insurgent activity, more observation points to monitor areas where guerrillas might gather, more checkpoints at which fugitives might be caught, and other benefits.
| Citizens of mixed areas may also welcome an increased US troop presence to deter the rival armed groups that turn their streets into battlefields. |
But the reaction of ordinary Iraqis to increased US forces appears to be largely determined by where they live, and to which sect they belong. Sunni civilians regularly say that they want US troops to protect them against Shia militias, while Sunni politicians say they oppose US withdrawal for fear they will be left at the mercy of a largely Shia military. Citizens of mixed areas may also welcome an increased US troop presence to deter the rival armed groups that turn their streets into battlefields.
On the other hand, any deployment into predominantly Shia areas such as Sadr City, where the US military treads lightly and many inhabitants believe militias such as the Mahdi Army to do a better job protecting them than the authorities, would probably spark a backlash.
The surge that Mr Bush is expected to propose – reportedly increasing the 132,000-strong contingent in Iraq by as much as 20,000 – is unlikely to be on a scale that would allow more long-term “saturation” of dangerous areas. Still, the short-term suppression of sectarian violence might allow Iraqis and Americans to pursue other goals aimed at undercutting the insurgency: building up state institutions such as the army and police, reaching a political deal between Sunni and Shia communities, and reducing unemployment.
IraqÂ’s army, although hamstrung by administrative problems and poor morale, does appear to be slowly becoming more capable. US officers say that they will hand over full control over Iraqi units and provincial security to Iraqi officials by the end of this year. However, the army is less suited to gathering intelligence key to counterinsurgency than the police, who are corrupt, politicised, and ineffective even in parts of the country such as the southern city of Basra.