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| India-Pakistan |
| BugtiÂ’s killing is the biggest blunder since BhuttoÂ’s execution |
| 2006-08-27 |
| Editorial in the Daily Times Whatever his personality and past, Nawab Bugti’s death is bound to become part of the heroic lore of Baloch history of resistance against the state since 1947 and strengthen the separatist emotion in the province. Since much of the Baloch struggle had combined with the all-Pakistan campaign against such phenomena as military rule and the cruel centralism of One Unit, it will find resonance with most Pakistanis — especially in the smaller provinces. His death will put an end to the case building by the government before going for the kill on Saturday. The case built by the state against the rebellious ‘sardars’ was not incredible: their insurgents were blowing up public assets and carrying out attacks against state personnel, they had organised ‘farari’ camps where Baloch warriors were trained and, finally, they were recipients of large sums of money, possibly sent in by India through Afghanistan. But now all this will sound like so much unconvincing history. Baloch nationalism is based on a number of factors recognised by the textbooks but the most significant component is tribal resistance and honour. The sardari system provided leadership to this nationalism by upholding Baloch honour. While the Baloch politician developed flexible political skills, the Baloch sardar outshone him in the eyes of the Baloch people because of his inflexibility and an implacable assertion of Baloch rights. Of course, the Bugti-Marri-Mengal triumvirate of Baloch nationalism that developed over the years had its internal tensions and there was a tacit struggle for supremacy among the three. Needless to say, only the most radical could have won. It is in this framework that Nawab Bugti’s final choice of death has to be seen. And it is here that Islamabad has erred most grievously and might have to pay a high price for it. It has let Nawab Bugti win the final battle. He will now be the all-Balochistan symbol of resistance to Islamabad. If there is external interference in Balochistan it will only be strengthened. President Musharraf inherited a whole raft of “flaws of the state” when he was called upon to put Pakistan straight after 9/11. After almost 20 years of jihad the state had developed tolerance for many centres of power the politicians were forced to accept in the 1990s. The central problem that he faced was the lack of the writ of the state in most parts of the country, although certain territories were traditionally accepted as exempt from normal state jurisdiction. We know how he has failed to solve the problems of the Tribal Areas in the face of the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat in the context of a growing vacuum of political support. But the situation in Balochistan has been the prickliest for him to grasp politically. The province is the country’s lifeline for the gas it produces and a guarantor of its future because of the gas reserves it holds for future exploitation. Balochistan has also been a legal grey area. Most of it is ‘B’ category, meaning that there is no police and no proper enforcement of the law of the land. It also remains the most economically backward area despite the rich natural resources it possesses. Its history of struggle against the centre sets it apart from the Tribal Areas where Islamabad is face to face with a new type of Talibanism. President Musharraf was mistaken in “discovering” that past governments had been too “soft” on Nawab Bugti and mistakenly wanted this “flaw of the state” sorted out. The PMLQ government intervened and tried the political path with Bugti, resulting in an agreed document, which was in the process of being implemented _ albeit very slowly and in the eyes of the Baloch, not at all. But the military establishment overruled the politicians and went for Mr Bugti. At this point Nawab Bugti was provoked into taking the final plunge to put on record his reaction to “what Islamabad was doing to Balochistan”. The pressure he felt came from the increased aggression of state policy, the bringing back of the sub-tribes he had driven out of the Bugti territory and the bombing of his residence complex. But his decision to go down fighting has transformed his death into martyrdom to the cause of the Baloch. His two grandsons have died with him; so have a number of Marri tribesmen, including possibly a son of Khair Bux Marri, the most intransigent of the sardari triumvirate. This will “inspire” many youngsters among the new generation of Baloch to seek “revenge”. Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal has already reacted in such terms. In Quetta, mobs have come out and damaged public property. But Balochistan is not a place for mass demonstrations; it is a territory of acts of revenge. How will the government tackle the Baloch backlash? Political support to the Musharraf establishment and the PMLQ government is at its lowest ebb. Balochistan will be ready to ignite at any time in the future. A pall of gloom has descended over Pakistan that will not lift in a hurry. This is the biggest blunder committed by the military since the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. |
| Posted by:john |