| Submit your comments on this article |
| Iraq |
| Counterinsurgency Track Record |
| 2006-07-05 |
| July 5, 2006: The U.S. Army has completed a revision of its counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, for the first time in twenty years. The army has a long history of success fighting guerillas. Even Vietnam, which conventional wisdom counts as a defeat, wasn't. The conventional wisdom, as is often the case, is wrong. By the time the last U.S. combat units pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972, the local guerilla movement, the Viet Cong, was destroyed. North Vietnam came south three years later with a conventional invasion, sending tank and infantry divisions, charging across the border and conquering their neighbor the old fashioned way. When the United States got involved with Vietnam in the late 1950s, there was good reason to believe American assistance would lead to the defeat of the communist guerilla movement in South Vietnam. In the previous two decades, there had been twelve communist insurgencies, and 75 percent of them had been defeated. These included Greek Civil War (1944-1949), Spanish Republican Insurgency (1944-1952), Iranian Communist Uprising (1945-1946), Philippine Huk War (1946-1954), Madagascan Nationalist Revolt (1947-1949), Korean Partisan War (1948-1953), Sarawak/Sabah "Confrontation" (1960-1966), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Kenyan Mau-Mau Rebellion (1952-1955). The communists won in the Cuban Revolution (1956-1958), the First Indochina War (1945-1954) and the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). The communists went on to lose the guerilla phase of the Second Indochina War (1959-1970). The main problem with COIN is that the American armed forces takes it for granted. U.S. troops have been defeating guerilla movements for centuries. Through all that time, COIN has been the most frequent form of warfare American troops have been involved with. But COIN has always been viewed as a minor, secondary, military role. It never got any respect. Even the U.S. Marine Corps, after half a century of COIN operations, were glad to put that behind them in the late 1930s. All that remained of that experience was a classic book, "The Small Wars Manual," written by some marine officers on the eve of World War II. That book, which is still in print, contained timeless wisdom and techniques on how to deal with COIN operations, and "small wars" in general. The basic truth is that COIN tactics and techniques have not changed for thousands of years. What has also not changed is the professional soldiers disdain for COIN operations. This sort of thing has never been considered "real soldiering." But the U.S. Army and Marines have finally come to accept that COIN is a major job, something that U.S. troops have always been good at, and something that you have to pay attention to. So when you see more news stories about the COIN manual, keep in mind the history of that kind of warfare, and how long, and successfully, Americans have been doing it. |
| Posted by:DanNY |
| #5 my $0.02... IMO the main reason the echalons above reality do not like COIN/LIC/MOOTOW/etc., is that above the platoon level there is actualy very little for field-grade officer types to do. Just make sure that each day the beans, bullets and band-aids get to the shooters, and PPT slides get to the political overseers, and you are one day closer to retirement. The BN and BDE CO's are reduced to politician style meet and greet with the local great and good. Its boring. (as an aside-- my RGT CO put on 40 lbs. while in the sand box, just from having to sit and eat and talk with the local sheiks. By the time we demobed, he couldn't properly fasten his IBA vest. I wonder if he could have applied for VA disability.) Down on the ground, with notable exceptions like Falluja or Hue, anything larger than a company just trips over itself. The Enemy seldom bunches larger than plt-company sized elements for fear of being JDAMmed to death. |
| Posted by: N guard 2006-07-05 18:37 |
| #4 It was covered as LIC, (Low Intensity Conflict), when I was a pup. |
| Posted by: whitecollar redneck 2006-07-05 13:05 |
| #3 The critical component of COIN is perception - information management, image, propaganda, whatever you want to call it. That's what makes assymmetric warfare work, when it does work, and fail when it fails. And that's where the West in general and the US in particular are weakest. Worse - it is not even clear that we realize that weakness, nor care. |
| Posted by: glenmore 2006-07-05 10:35 |
| #2 This American Heritage Dictionary entry has the very interesting entymology of schrift. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-07-05 10:08 |
| #1 The army has a long history of success fighting guerillas. Apaches, Philippines, various banana republics, etc. However, notice that the Headquaters boys in Washington only have wanted to fight the last big war, generally giving COIN short shift at their officer schools. The army has a long history of success fighting guerillas. Even Vietnam, which conventional wisdom counts as a defeat, wasn't. The conventional wisdom, as is often the case, is wrong. By the time the last U.S. combat units pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972, the local guerilla movement, the Viet Cong, was destroyed. Even Vietnam, which conventional wisdom counts as a defeat, wasn't. The conventional wisdom, as is often the case, is wrong. By the time the last U.S. combat units pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972, the local guerilla movement, the Viet Cong, was destroyed Heck, the Battle of Tet resulted in the destruction of the VC in the South. From that time on, the war had to be carried by the NVA. However, Walter and his collegues in the media decided that even though we'd suffered less casualties than the Battle of the Bulge and stopped every goal of the enemy which he treated as an historic American victory, they'd portray Tet as a failure. MSM lied and millions died. |
| Posted by: Slosing Glemble1381 2006-07-05 09:47 |