| Submit your comments on this article | |||||||||||
| Iraq | |||||||||||
| Pentagon says too MANY troops took part in Iraq operation | |||||||||||
| 2006-04-20 | |||||||||||
| From think-tank analysts to angry retired generals to Capitol Hill lawmakers, it has become nearly universal conventional wisdom that the U.S. invasion force that conquered Iraq in 2003 lacked the manpower to secure the country after Saddam’s fall. But the Pentagon’s civilian policymakers have learned a much different lesson. According to a senior civilian who played a crucial role in developing the just-released Quadrennial Defense Review, the problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom was not too few U.S. troops, but too many. “You could have adopted a radically different concept of operations,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “You could have trained free forces in various parts of Iraq and over time they could have gained greater control of the country. “We’ve heard a lot of calls with people saying they would like to have seen a much larger force, especially for stability tasks. ... What is in some ways just as interesting … is what if we had gone in with a much smaller force, but from the get-go leveraged the capabilities of the Iraqis?”
But the concept fits neatly with Rumsfeld’s push to use precision, speed and information technology to reduce the manpower requirements of warfare. And it’s more than just an argument over theory or past history; the less-is-more concept is crucial to the QDR’s recommendations against increasing the size of U.S. ground forces, which analysts and politicians across the political spectrum have advocated. To a number of experts, it illustrates the thinking of a Pentagon leadership that seems unwilling or unable to abandon previously held opinions in the face of new evidence. “Do they actually understand what is going on?” asks retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes, who has served in Iraq and written extensively on counterinsurgency and the future of warfare. “They still don’t get it. They’re staying with their faith more than with reality. That’s the part that scares me.”
“There is a period of time where there is a security vacuum,” said Michele Flournoy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “What you need is a larger force for an initial period, so you don’t allow widespread looting and chaos and disorder. … If you go in bigger, you can come out faster.”
“You’ve got a group of people in [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] who powerfully believe in small, fast, light, high-tech,” Biddle said. When such planners must choose between using a massive, traditional invasion force or one that relies on special operations forces and high-tech weapons, “one of them looks like castor oil, and the other is an ice cream cone,” Biddle said. “The preferred model of warfare for Rumsfeld and company is Afghanistan,” Flournoy said. “That’s what they want all campaigns to look like.” In many situations, Flournoy said, such an “indirect” approach is preferable. But applying it to Iraq, she suggested, ignores several facts. A campaign light on U.S. troops could succeed in a situation where an existing government needs support against an insurgency, she said, or, in a case such as Afghanistan, when an established insurgent fighting force opposes a weak central government. Neither condition existed in Iraq in 2003. While exile leaders such as Ahmed Chalabi claimed to have thousands of freedom fighters at their disposal, their actual capabilities were much more modest. “It’s one thing to say you’re going to install these guys in the government ministries,” Flournoy said. “But to say they had viable security forces — that borders on fantasy.”
Words vs. actions Perhaps more important than the argument over what already has happened in Iraq is the debate over the future size and shape of the military, and strategies for future operations. Iraq has been held up as Exhibit A in the case for a larger Army and Marine Corps. Many outside analysts and retired officers say the strains of the past three years make clear the ground forces simply aren’t large enough to carry out the nation’s strategy. But the senior Pentagon civilian said concepts such as the different approach to the Iraq invasion were crucial to the QDR, which attempts to lay out a long-range strategy. “It’s not one-size-fits-all,” the official said. “But we increasingly see, especially in complex situations where we need to defeat military forces as well as the broader challenge of stability and establishing legitimate governance, that we have to think about some very different approaches.” This led to the QDR’s conclusion that while the size of the U.S. military is about right, the available personnel should be shifted away from traditional heavy formations to boost such capabilities as special operations, civil affairs and support functions, the official said. “People haven’t grasped the point that it’s a big admission on our part that the mix of forces and capabilities we’ve got is wrong and we need to change that,” the official said.
“Do you want to count on the assumption that you’ll always have some indigenous force that’s up to handling the job with more modest support from special ops?” Flournoy said. “I’m not willing to count on it. … I think it’s a prudent hedge to have ground forces that are able to do that.”
Hammes, the retired Marine colonel, said this is especially true if, as the QDR contends, the military must take on counterinsurgency as a core mission. The primary requirement for counterinsurgency “is security, which is manpower-intensive,” said Hammes, whose book, “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century,” has made him one of the country’s leading experts on fighting insurgents.
As far as the plans Rumsfeld and his senior aides have for the U.S. military, “There’s a great deal of tension between what they’re saying and what they’re doing,” Hammes said. “It just doesn’t make any sense.”
| |||||||||||
| Posted by:lotp |
| #31 Everybody seems to be forgetting two significant factors: the 4th ID wasn't able to come in through Turkey as the original plan called for, and the collapse of the Iraqi Army happened so fast because all the big-shots cleared out BEFORE their units faced American troops. It was decided afterwards that the 4th wasn't in position to help in Iraq, even as follow-up forces. We also had no idea we would face the kind of asymetric warfare we ran into. Personally, I believe the military is too small for all the jobs it has to do, and we're asking far too much of the troops that go back time and time again into the hostilities. We also don't allow those soldiers enough time to integrate all the new techniques and practices that are coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. I do believe part of the problem between the Generals and Rumsfeld is the realignment of forces from a Division/Corps/Army heierarchy to a small-unit/brigade/theater commander heierarchy. I also believe Rumsfeld is right on this. The only enemies that large-unit tactics might be necessary for are China and Russia, and I can't see us engaged in a conventional war with either of them. Even if we should be forced into a war with either of these nations, the small-unit approach, in a combined-arms environment, would be more effective than set-piece divisions, with less overhead, putting more combat troops on the "point of the spear". The Civil War is a good object lesson in how such forces operate: the massive human-wave attacks at Gettysberg are analogous to divisional combat, while Jeb Stuart's marauders are the equivalent of the small-unit operations. Gettysberg achieved little beyond destroying large parts of both armies, and precluding a Southern victory. Stuart's marauders tied up thousands of Union soldiers, panicked half the population of the Shenandoah Valley, and made supplying Grant's armies twice as difficult as they would normally be. Modern technology plays as a force-multiplier to small-unit effectiveness, and allows tactical changes to be implemented in policy when something doesn't work, or when something works better than expected. Generals always begin a new war by fighting the last one - the one they learned from. It takes time, effort, and strong wills to ensure that change, when necessary, is implemented. Check the number of generals sacked at the beginning of World War II, and you will begin to get an idea of what Rumsfeld is doing. |
| Posted by: Old Patriot 2006-04-20 21:51 |
| #30 the point is on RR's head. Troll fever - catch it! |
| Posted by: Frank G 2006-04-20 19:46 |
| #29 The point is victory |
| Posted by: 6 2006-04-20 19:41 |
| #28 As to the question at the beginning of the comments, the Crow Scouts utilized against the Apaches were an unmitigated success. Ran the Apaches into the ground, and did it quite cheaply. So native troops can be quite effective against an enemy force, especially if you exploit their tribal/ethnic hatreds and permit them a level of revenge-taking. |
| Posted by: Shieldwolf 2006-04-20 19:34 |
| #27 . Victory seems too far off into the future. And there you have it. |
| Posted by: 6 2006-04-20 17:50 |
| #26 RR is spinning for power, not for victory. Spinning for truth, maybe. Victory seems too far off into the future. |
| Posted by: RR 2006-04-20 17:15 |
| #25 If anyone has BDS it is you people. I mean, the man can do no wrong! Fire Rumsfeld? Forget it. That would be an admission of failure. Where the military knows what they want and need to do, the government either doesn't or, in the case of Jaafari's Joke, is opposed because they're Iranian puppets. Sure. You can always spin it that way. Of course, the wonderful thing about spin, is that given enough angular speed, you can say that it's the US that can't handle Iranian puppets in their sphere of influence. Funny how spin works. |
| Posted by: RR 2006-04-20 17:12 |
| #24 Me too, Jim#6. Everyone but the Arabs DID. Actually, if we include Afghanistan in the picture for completeness, everyone but the devout of Islam DID. There's a hard lesson in there, somewhere. And I agree, RR is spinning for power, not for victory. |
| Posted by: Ebbomp Thurt3429 2006-04-20 15:18 |
| #23 I understand your analysis, Besoeker. But you left out two major players: the media and the Dems Sounds nice when you say that but really... it's the Iraqis who dropped the ball. I guess I expected them to go back to work the next day. |
| Posted by: Jim#6 2006-04-20 15:11 |
| #22 Myself, I think the turnover to the Iraqis, without any reserved functions such as security, was far too fast. The Iraqis have officially been running the show for the last 2 years (Fallujah I and Najaf being prime examples of where politics screwed up perfectly good and necessary operations) and that is a huge part of the problem. Where the military knows what they want and need to do, the government either doesn't or, in the case of Jaafari's Joke, is opposed because they're Iranian puppets. For example, the Jabr refusal to field the trained police and the free-run of the militias and death squads. RR apparently has a BDS stiffie with a Rumsfeld fetish and ignores the several parts of the equation that don't fit its hit mentality. The point is victory over the asshats. The major impediment for the last 2 years has been purely political, interfering in all things military, both within Iraq and here in the US. |
| Posted by: Hupeash Thrineng9263 2006-04-20 15:10 |
| #21 Not till Saddam's dead for you. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-04-20 15:03 |
| #20 Liberated? Not yet. |
| Posted by: RR 2006-04-20 14:56 |
| #19 Yeah Rummy has really screwed thing up. Look at our successes. Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, France. Fifty million liberated and counting is not a bad record. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-04-20 14:54 |
| #18 LASIK is quite inexpensive nowadays - I highly recommend it for those who are shortsighted. Unfortunately it won't help those who are totally blind, or equivalently, apologists for Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld may be the new school, but clearly it matters not in places like...oh I don't know...Ramadi, 3 years into the conflict. So when is this new doctrine of Rumsfeld's going to bear fruit? Soon? Any time now? 3 more years? Or is Ramadi a special case, not winnable at all? Or Iraq for that matter. Rummy's new school: casualties are low, steady as she goes, then get the fuck out. |
| Posted by: RR 2006-04-20 14:46 |
| #17 Ah, the Goldie Locks syndrome. Not enough, too much, or just right. It's history, the only useful result now is for lessons learned. But, each operation is unique in large measure. |
| Posted by: Captain America 2006-04-20 14:44 |
| #16 "All The Way" 11B5S. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2006-04-20 13:02 |
| #15 Ima going to echo Beoseker and recommend that everyone here read On Strategy. It is actually quite a slim volume and could be read in a weekend if you dedicated yourself to it. |
| Posted by: 11A5S 2006-04-20 12:03 |
| #14 I foresee a whole new range of problems had we used fewer personnel. Granted, the conventional war would have been over with all deliberate speed in either case, and yet, had we not utterly destroyed the Baathists as a functioning unit, I suspect we would have a lot more trouble today than we do now. Compare with the German model. Was there ever any doubt that the entire Nazi organization, military and civilian, had to be utterly dismantled? And yet, even as thorough a job as we did, there were still vestigial Nazi groups performing routine government functions for quite a while. Such bureaucrats were by themselves toothless, but had any serious Nazi elements remained, they could have put flesh on those bones with great speed--using the remaining framework to reconstruct their power. In any event, we destroyed the Baathist regime and for a long while there was considerable chaos. Saddam knew that his military had little chance of conventionally stopping the US military, so many efforts were made to establish a shadow leadership to lead an unconventional war. Now how in heck could we have tried to use existing Baathist frameworks more than we did, yet somehow exclude those who were part of the effort to reestablish the Baathist regime? It is difficult now, had we behaved otherwise, it might have proven impossible. The new Iraqi government would have been so infiltrated with saboteurs and traitors that the civil war would have happened. So no, in 20/20 hindsight, we used the right number of personnel. Not too few and not too many. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2006-04-20 12:02 |
| #13 "He DOES answer to Bush. And Bush answers to the people of the United States. ANd the people of the US, to judge Bush's confidence in Rummy, need facts about what happened. Key fact being, did Rummy really provide the generals with all the forces they said they needed (as he has repeatedly said he did) or did they not ask, cause they knew it was pointless. The only ones who know the truth to that are Rummy himself, and the generals." Yeah, so? You've proven nothing here. Nothing. Stated the obvious and implied something sinister about Rummsfeld with your spin. Bullshit. "Two of the generals DID command big units in Iraq. I see no evidence that what motivates them is careerism. Rummy is a patriot. So are the generals, AFAICT. Lets listen to what each has to say." We've heard what each has to say. It's America. No one has stopped anyone from speaking out, have they? That there are traditions which have been drubbed by it is an issue, however. And these traditions have good reasons for their existence - not undermining civilian control of the military. Disagreeing with your boss' strategy is common. Outside of the military it's a minor issue compared to inside, but it usually ends in having your ass handed to you with a pink slip. "The problem clearly went at least as high as Miller, and probably Feith. Rummy didnt seem all that concerned with the systemic problems, and was slow to discipline Miller and Feith." Systemic? Bullshit. Isolated. Rumsfeld allowed the Military Justice System to work, just as he should have, instead of letting a bunch of MSM assholes steeped in BDS railroad him into stupid actions. BTW, what part of this are you having trouble with? "The military was profoundly embarrassed IIUC, and not just by Lynndie and her buddies, but the whole systemic problem." Yes, indeed. Bad apples always embarrass the organizations they infest. Systemic? There you go again. Prove it. You're full of shit. "Did you speak up when the active brass was digging into Clinton and utilizing all their contacts on the hill to keep open gays from being allowed in the military?" LOL. The ultimate PCIdiot issue. Gays don't belong in the military and you lack common sense if you can't recognize that fact. There are innumerable issues which arise from it due to the accommodations afforded people in the military. Obviously, you have never served. What a large post, my dear. Yet it fails to impress in any way. |
| Posted by: Sliper Shereper2779 2006-04-20 11:35 |
| #12 "As I said in another forum, Rumsfeld does not answer to the Generals. He answered to George Bush." He DOES answer to Bush. And Bush answers to the people of the United States. ANd the people of the US, to judge Bush's confidence in Rummy, need facts about what happened. Key fact being, did Rummy really provide the generals with all the forces they said they needed (as he has repeatedly said he did) or did they not ask, cause they knew it was pointless. The only ones who know the truth to that are Rummy himself, and the generals. "The whining of the Pentagon chairborne brigades is all about commanding large units in combat. That's how you get promoted. In the War on Terror, few generals get to command in combat. The small unit commanders are earning the experience and awards." Two of the generals DID command big units in Iraq. I see no evidence that what motivates them is careerism. Rummy is a patriot. So are the generals, AFAICT. Lets listen to what each has to say. "While the prisoner abuse charges were damaging, it is laughable to blame Rumsfeld for that." The problem clearly went at least as high as Miller, and probably Feith. Rummy didnt seem all that concerned with the systemic problems, and was slow to discipline Miller and Feith. " The media created the circus. And, in point of fact, the military ought to have been embarrassed by Lynndie and her buddies." The military was profoundly embarrassed IIUC, and not just by Lynndie and her buddies, but the whole systemic problem. "Lastly, in this country the civilians control the military. I'd rather their hands were tied a time or two than have to suffer the results that we have seen where civilian control of the military is lost." Did you speak up when the active brass was digging into Clinton and utilizing all their contacts on the hill to keep open gays from being allowed in the military? |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2006-04-20 10:10 |
| #11 One value of this escapade in retrospect may be to establish that the borders of the middle east drawn on maps in London in 1922 are disfunctional. We'll also know that after Iran. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-04-20 10:09 |
| #10 the QDR is aimed at the future. The idea laid out here is interesting. To have liberated a PART of the country, then raised local forces to move on. Note this is NOT the same as the insert Chalabi idea that the State Dept, IIUC, vetoed. That assumed wed liberate the country all at once, as we actually did, but would have brought exiles into help occupy it. Its debatable in retrospect whether that would have worked - using locals was a great idea, but in retrospect its clear Chalabi, though not a bad administrator, had very litle support in-country. This alternative has both advantages and disadvantages. It would have made it more of an Iraqi op earlier, and maybe eased the diplo situation. OTOH the civil war issue is quite serious, as weve since found, and this might have made it worse. And you cant just dismiss that and say the Sunnis were favored - of course they were, but any new democratic Iraq still has to include them as citizens, and unless youre willing consider ethnic cleansing, to establish a stable iraq thats not totalitarian, you have to do it in a way that doent exacerbate ethnic tensions. There are other issues as well - a longer war, which this involves, means more chances for Saddam, whos left in control of the Sunni Triangle, while you build up a force elsewhere, to make mischief. Remember, one of the original reasons to go to war was because of WMDs and the possibiliy of them going to terrorists. I for one, do NOT believe the admin deliberately lied about that - they really believed it was a possibility. One of the reasons for the blitzkrieg to Baghdad was to preempt any WMD response. All of which is irrelevant to the question of whether we were correctly prepared for Iraq. By winter 2003 Rumsfeld knew he wasnt going to get a Chalabi force, and he certainly wasnt planning on a take one area and then build strategy. He WAS planning on a blitz to Baghdad with US forces. Given that, he had an obligation to plan on the aftermath. Its becoming clear that he never seriously planned for it, that he dismissed earlier serious work on the problem done by the State dept and others, that he had too few resources for the immediate aftermath of victory, and that that had a serious impact on the course of the last 3 years. OTOH this DOES seem relevant to future war planning. Take Iran for example. There are many parts of Iran that might be suitable for a strategy like this. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2006-04-20 10:01 |
| #9 After reading this, I'm thinking Iran. |
| Posted by: john 2006-04-20 10:01 |
| #8 Chuck, I'm not so sure how many logixtic lessons were learned in Iraq, but I think we're going to find out in Iran. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-04-20 09:53 |
| #7 As I said in another forum, Rumsfeld does not answer to the Generals. He answered to George Bush. The whining of the Pentagon chairborne brigades is all about commanding large units in combat. That's how you get promoted. In the War on Terror, few generals get to command in combat. The small unit commanders are earning the experience and awards. While the prisoner abuse charges were damaging, it is laughable to blame Rumsfeld for that. The media created the circus. And, in point of fact, the military ought to have been embarrassed by Lynndie and her buddies. Lastly, in this country the civilians control the military. I'd rather their hands were tied a time or two than have to suffer the results that we have seen where civilian control of the military is lost. |
| Posted by: Chuck Simmins 2006-04-20 09:50 |
| #6 I understand your analysis, Besoeker. But you left out two major players: the media and the Dems, both of whom arguably worked hard to make sure the strategy that was chosen would fail. War is indeed the pursuit of geopolitics by other means. There were geopolitical considerations woven into the original strategy and it was precisely those (IMO) which most alarmed the Dems and the MSM and which they fought tooth, nail and "fake but accurate" story to derail. I agree there were big risks in Rumsfeld's approach. The reality is that there were ALSO major geopolitical risks in dealing with Iraq from a framework rooted in old doctrine. I seldom hear proponents of that doctrine admit this. You are not alone, however, in deeply resenting the signals Rumsfeld has sent to the Army's general officer staff ... |
| Posted by: lotp 2006-04-20 09:46 |
| #5 But the senior Pentagon civilian said concepts such as the different approach to the Iraq invasion were crucial to the QDR, which attempts to lay out a long-range strategy. What about crucial to fucking VICTORY! This entire General Officer (GO) backlash is a product of a pentagon centric, econo-war diplo approach utilizing the secure base-camp (Green Zone) limited engagement mentality which led to what most would agree is something less than total victory 35 years ago. Harry Summers book "On Strategy" which covers the period 1965-1972 and has been around for a while, would be a good read for many of these pentagon elites who think a counterinsurgency warfare and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) are new concepts. Like the Prussian war strategy, Clausewitz would find Rumsfeld's strategy "intellectually arrogant." What is forgotten is War is as Clausewitz put it, "merely a continuation of politics." The race to early "success" and host nation hand-off as opposed to victory, along with the premature entry of Bremmerite diplomats and politicians ties the hands of military commanders. I can assure you the somewhat fatherly and occassionally deferential SECDEF you see in the news conference is not the same man found in the daily pentagon grind. The "pottery house rules" (you break it - you buy it) voiced by General Powell and the cautions of General Shinseki were both lost on this man. The unceremonious departure of General Shinseki and the SECDEF's bringing General Pete Schoomaker, a fine Special Forces officer, out of retirement to be the Army Chief of Staff and to hurry along "Army Transformation" both sent very bad signals which have not been forgotten. Also not forgotten on the GO's has been the pentagon directed legal hammering of soldiers and marines under the UCMJ involving Rules of Engagement (ROE) and "prisoner abuse" charges. Yes Major General Taguba, I'm talking about you and your Abu Gharib reports which should have never seen the light of day or a reporters notebook. All of the events of Abu Gharib could have been handled in the manner coined by LTG Donn A. Starry, "soldier's business." War is a bitch, bad stuff happens, it ain't pretty, correct it and move on. As for the retired generals, let them speak their piece and let the chips fall where they may. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2006-04-20 09:40 |
| #4 IMHO, the lesson that we really need to learn from the war is how to supply fast moving forces in a situation where enemy troops have been bypassed. I think we have a real handle on combined arms operations, and the lower rank officers from this war will make outstanding generals. As for the occupation, the assumption that training is easy underlies the thinking here. Ummm... it's not. 50% of the training that our troops have they bring with them into the service. It's cultural, and that is why so much of the work in training the Iraqis or Afghans is much harder. I'm not sure these great thinkers can demonstrate a war where the use of native troops took the burden off of American soldiers. Perhaps Vietnam, but we were in retreat and any warm body between us an another casulty was the idea. Certainly the French resistance was not a key player in the liberation of France. The ROK took years to become an effective force and Americans bore the brunt of the Korean War. I still think that the logistics of combined arms is where the greatest lessons are to be learned. |
| Posted by: Chuck Simmins 2006-04-20 09:35 |
| #3 Bingo, NS. |
| Posted by: lotp 2006-04-20 07:59 |
| #2 Counteroffensive to defend Rumsfeld begins. Indirect method to be used. Heavily armoured but immobile retirees caught in cossfire. Perhaps more important than the argument over what already has happened in Iraq is the debate over the future size and shape of the military, and strategies for future operations. Perhaps more important than that is the promotion lists Rumsfeld will send to Congress in the next 2 1/2 years. That will decide the debate and that is why Rummy will not leave. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-04-20 07:53 |
| #1 "...push to use precision, speed and information technology to reduce the manpower requirements of warfare." This is absolutely essential. Even if in a given situation 'more troops is better', we don't usually have them available. And in this war, with potentially hundreds of battlefronts, we can never have enough troops available for that operational model; even if the entire country was motivated and mobilized we'd still be badly outnumbered. We MUST fight 'smarter, not harder.' |
| Posted by: Glenmore 2006-04-20 07:44 |