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| India-Pakistan |
| State Response to Insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir |
| 2005-12-16 |
| One of the best primers on the J+K conflict I've ever seen. India: State Response to Insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir â The Jammu Case By THOMAS A. MARKS Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol.12, No.3 (Autumn 2004), pp.122â143 http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/LessonsLearned/Misc/MarksArticle.pdf |
| Posted by:john |
| #3 downloaded and filed thx. |
| Posted by: Red Dog 2005-12-16 23:46 |
| #2 THOMAS A. MARKS is the author of Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London, 1996), considered the current standard on the subject of âpeopleâs war.â A former U.S. Government officer who is a member of the editorial board of Small Wars and Insurgencies (London), he has recently served as the Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University (Quantico), where he taught âInsurgency and Operational Art.â He is an Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU, Hurlburt Field, FL) and a consultant for several firms specializing in political risk and personal security, to include RAND, where he is a member of the Insurgency Board. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and in his Ph.D. work at the University of Hawaii focused on the relationship between popular upheaval and revolutionary crisis (published as Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspective, Bangkok: White Lotus). In recent years, Dr. Marks has, in a variety of publications for a variety of clients, analyzed conflicts as far-flung as those in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Laos, the Philippines, and Northern Ireland. His scholarly and journalistic works number in the hundreds. His latest book is Counter-Revolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang (London: Frank Cass, 1997); his latest monograph is Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002). |
| Posted by: john 2005-12-16 15:44 |
| #1 Two minor errors - "mutual possession of thermonuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India" Pakistan's nukes are fission only - one of the first Chinese missile capable designs. India tested a fission weapon in 1974 and various other types in 1998 - Thermonuclear, Fission, low yield using reactor grade plutonium etc. "Events took a dramatic turn when, in the second half of the 1980s, missteps by India culminated in popular upheaval as a result of tampering in the 1987 state elections. Training, weapons and equipment were increasingly gained in POK, but the movement remained an internal phenomenon until Islamabad moved decisively from 1989 to support rival elements that sought not independence but union with Pakistan." "Continuous Struggle" - the Biography of Amanullah Khan, one of the founders of the JKLF makes it clear that this is incorrect. "The ISI first made contact with the JKLF in early 1987 through the organisation's senior leader, Farooq Haider. Haider made a deal with the ISI whereby the JKLF was to bring to POK young Kashmiris willing to fight Indian rule; they would then be given military training and arms by the ISI to start an insurgency in the Valley. The first batch of eight young fighters from Indian Kashmir were said to have reached POK in February 1988. They were given military training and weapons by the ISI and sent back with instructions not to start anything until they got a green signal from Pakistan" "Three separatist leaders, Mohammed Afzal, Ghulam Hasan Lone and Ghulam Nabi Bhatt, were called to POK in June 1988. After lengthy deliberations, we asked them to start the insurgency on 13 July, 1988." The reason for the wait "until they got a green signal from Pakistan" is quite simple. In February 1988 the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan in one year. The ISI needed time to reorient the jihad towards India. The insurrection had nothing to do with "rigged elections" nor did it suddenly arise from the local population. It was a well planned campaign of "subconventional" warfare using proxies. As Marks points out, the jihad in J+K cannot be sustained without continous Pakistani support. |
| Posted by: john 2005-12-16 15:24 |