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| Terror Networks |
| How al-Qaeda uses the internet |
| 2005-12-08 |
| Al Qaedaâs sophisticated and fast-paced use of the Internet while effective in getting its message across is both risk-prone and challenging. According to an analysis produced for Stratfor, the US-based online news and analysis site, by Kamran Bokhari, text-based, audio taped and video-recorded jihadi statements posted on numerous websites have become part of the daily diet of news. Al Qaeda leaders understand the value the media attach to the messages they send and have dedicated significant resources to public relations. The Internet offers Islamist militants a low-tech, cost-effective, minimal-risk medium through which they can demonstrate their existence and operational status, conveniently reach out to their constituents and participate in the battle for public support in the Muslim world. While the principal Al Qaeda leadership has relied on sending audio and video messages via more old-fashioned means, such as Arab-language satellite channels, its more vibrant Iraqi branch, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has not only been the most active in terms of staging attacks, but has also maintained a steady stream of messages through the Internet. Bokhari writes that opportunity and ability have much to do with why Al Qaedaâs main leadership is not using the Internet for its communications but its Iraqi leadership is. There is a variance in the operational tempo between Al Qaeda âprimeâ and its al-Zarqawi wing. Issuing online communiqués poses certain challenges for a jihadi group. At the material level, a group wishing to communicate online must have computer hardware and software and secure connections to the Internet, all of which need to be housed at a protected location that the group can access with relative ease when necessary. Many times, online jihadi messages are posted on local web-hosting sites in the Arab and Muslim world or via proxy server cut outs in Europe or Asia. The analyst underlines the quick footwork involved in evading US and allied intelligence and security agencies fighting the war on global jihadism in cyberspace and searching for militantsâ virtual outposts. The jihadis face two types of threats. When a jihadi website is detected, it is shut down by the company hosting the site. Some jihadi groups are accustomed to having their sites shut down, which is why the sites resurface at alternative addresses shortly after being taken down. The second more dangerous threat to the militants is the groupâs physical location being traced from its virtual portal. While this happens infrequently, when it does occur, the best law enforcement can hope for is to catch the groupâs webmaster or the middlemen who relay information to the webmaster. Just as it maintains multiple layers among its horizontal units and vertical echelons of leadership for security purposes, Al Qaeda maintains similar arrangements between those who order press releases and those who generate them. Bokhari points out that if Al Qaeda were a normal organisation operating legally in the public sphere, there would still be a need for central coordination through one or more official spokespersons or a dedicated mass media team. âBut for the most notorious and wanted organisation in the world, coordinating the flow of information is exponentially more cumbersome. The key issue is how to maintain secure, organised communications from the networkâs sub-units to the central leadership, on to those in charge of making sure the message reaches the groupâs websites, or the clearinghouses that disseminate discourse from a wide range of jihadi actors around the world,â he explains. More sophisticated jihadi groups likely operate their own servers, which is a more reliable means of making sure the media can locate the site and statements and provide them with a much larger audience than they could procure on their own. According to the writer, militant Islamists are content to get the gist of their message out so that the general public comes to know that they are âalive and kickingâ. Such knowledge helps build Al Qaedaâs reputation as a potent force that is able to sustain itself against insurmountable odds. That message gets out to the public even if only portions of the jihadisâ statements get reported. The Muslim world is the core audience and the militants know that once word of a new message is reported, those who are interested will seek them out by going to their websites. Nowadays, many terrorism-monitoring services provide full text translations of the messages, which can sometimes help the jihadis hold or gain ground in the battle for support. âIssuing communiqués is an integral part of a successful jihadi organisationâs operations. News media and jihadi supporters alike rely on the militants to disseminate messages that provide a context in which to understand militant attacks,â he adds. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |