THE governmentâs counterterrorism strategy is failing, according to a leaked paper by the prime ministerâs delivery unit, which was set up to ensure policies work effectively.
That's because you're fighting SPECTRE and you've got no 007... | In an indictment of Labourâs war on terror, the confidential document says that key policies designed to prevent Al-Qaeda attacks and stop terrorism taking root in Britain are âimmatureâ and âdisjointedâ. Others, it adds, are unrelated to the âreal worldâ and show no sign of making progress.
So somebody's trying to dump the "multicultural understanding group hug" approach? Hope he's got another job lined up... | The paper, which formed the backbone of a presentation this month to Downing Street insiders, will be seen by some as a criticism of Charles Clarke, who as home secretary has responsibility for running much of Britainâs counterterrorism effort. It suggests that a possible solution to the problem would be to appoint a new minister in the Cabinet Office charged with responsibility for delivering an effective counterterrorism strategy.
A bureaucratic solution? Just fooking brilliant. Here I was thinking in terms of fighting the enemy, identifying the key players, issuing death warrants, and then hunting bad guyz down and bumping them off. Silly me. | The Downing Street leak is a critique of Project Contest, the codename for the governmentâs overall counterterrorism strategy. Drawn up last year in the wake of the Madrid bombings, the strategy was given added impetus by the July 7 suicide attacks in London and is designed to tie together all four key elements of Britainâs war on terror: preparedness, prevention, pursuit and protection.
If, given the evidence, you're not doing all you can to prepare for terrorist assaults, you should be voted out or even overthrown. Period. It's the job of a government to be prepared for that sort of thing, no matter how distasteful it may be. Government is more than just handing out money and jobs. The best prevention is to quietly round up potential perps â especially holy men â as soon as there's the least bit of evidence they're going to go off. If the evidence won't stand up in court, charge them with immigration offenses, or drug dealing, or jay walking, or skulking in a restricted area. In the case of holy men, you can always find porn on their computers, even if you have to put it there, which I'll bet you won't. Pursuit's fine, but you've gotta do something with them when you catch them; I suggest killing them after extracting any information they have that you don't already have. If somebody's watching, I suppose you could jug them or deport them, or deport them after jugging them until they're old and frail. All of that adds up to protection. | The document says the policy is mired in confusion, with âlittle effective co-ordinationâ and no clear leadership. It adds that there is âlittle confidenceâ in the ability of the security apparatus to tackle the problem and that âit is very difficult to demonstrate that progress has been madeâ.
Even if they're successful, that's still going to be difficult. Not only does a large part of the press pooh-pooh any successes, but you can't really show stacks of corpses on the teevee. | In its conclusions, the 11- page review states: âThe strategy is immature. Forward planning is disjointed or has yet to occur. Accountability for delivery is weak. Real world impact is seldom measured.â The planâs objectives are dismissed as âvagueâ.
Sounds like they spend all their time planning and not enough time, if any, executing. | The findings are based on interviews with dozens of officials in Whitehall charged with protecting the country from terrorist attack. Quoting a litany of their criticisms, the memo says: âActivity is not connected or coherent. Whoâs in charge? We measure meetings and reports, not real world impact.â
Yep. That's the problem. My guess is that it's rooted in fear of making a mistake. Any guesses as to why that's so? Anyone? Bueller? | The paper is particularly embarrassing for Tony Blair and Clarke because vast resources have been spent on counterterrorism since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Overall spending on security will rise from £1.5 billion in 2004-5 to £2.1 billion by 2007-8. Yesterday David Davis, the shadow home secretary and contender for the Tory party leadership, said: âThis document appears to be extra worrying because it appears to demonstrate major flaws in the governmentâs counterterrorism strategy â flaws which, if not corrected, could worsen the risk to the British public.â
Tell 'em how you're going to do it better, Dave. Otherwise, shut your fudge up, 'cuz you don't have any ideas, either. | The delivery unit was set up in 2001 under Professor Sir Michael Barber, one of Blairâs key aides. Now staffed by 40 officials under Peter Thomas, Blairâs chief adviser on delivery, it aims to ensure government policies work effectively.
I think I'd have gone with an engineer, or a cop, or a military man. Find somebody who's actually managed something. | The review suggests that much of the work across government departments has simply been a series of talking shops in which Whitehall mandarins have failed to get to grips with the reality of the terrorist threat.
Ohfergawdsake. At least enroll the guys in Project Management 101. Tell 'em about deliverables and metrics and constraints and timelines. | One of the weaknesses identified is lack of leadership in the role of security and intelligence co-ordinator, Britainâs top spymaster. He is responsible to Blair for co-ordinating security, intelligence and emergency-related matters. Sir Richard Mottram, permanent secretary at the work and pensions department, was recently appointed to take over the post.
Pensions. How appropriate. |
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