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| Southeast Asia |
| Bali bombings show potent web of terror |
| 2005-10-04 |
| The last time the Indonesian resort island of Bali was struck by terrorist bombers, security forces hit back hard, splintering the main network behind the killings and throwing its alleged leaders in jail. Saturday's suicide bombings on the same island demonstrate the tenacity of the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah network and the relative ease of carrying out such attacks. Jemaah Islamiyah, which emerged in the 1990s as Southeast Asia's leading terrorist network, is very different from the one confronted by authorities three years ago. Experts say Jemaah Islamiyah previously had a set structure of four divisions, spread regionally across Southeast Asia and Australia. But that structure suffered under the crackdown following the 2002 Bali bombing, forcing the remaining fighters to reach out to other groups and focus on recruiting, they say. "These days, they're tapping into a slew of other networks," said Ken Conboy, a Jakarta-based security consultant and author of an upcoming book on terrorism in Southeast Asia. These other groups "are willing to take up the anti-West cause that the JI was really the one that pioneered." Even their tactics have changed. Saturday's bombings were carried out with explosive belts or backpacks - possibly a sign that terrorists under scrutiny from police opted for a more easily concealed weapon than their previous method of car-bombings. The two Malaysians suspected of masterminding the weekend attacks - Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Mohamed Top allegedly have taken center stage in the group since the crackdown. Azahari is known as "Demolition Man" for his knowledge of explosives, while Noordin has been dubbed "Moneyman" for his ability to raise money and recruit bombers. The two have been able to capitalize on the group's deep ties in the region: Jemaah Islamiyah grew out of the conservative Darul Islam movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and many of its founders honed their military skills - and their reputed connections with al-Qaida - in Afghanistan in the 1980s. That long history has been key to the group's ability to change with the times and count on assistance from other terrorist organizations. It has been linked to groups in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and elsewhere in the region. "The group's reaction to failure, and its ability to continue operations after significant losses ... demonstrate JI is doctrinally fluid, and analyzes its failures in an effort to adapt, learn and grow," Wayne Turnbill, a U.S. Army captain, wrote in a 2003 study on the group at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The bombers also have been able to count on a sad fact: it doesn't take much manpower or technical expertise to create the mayhem of Bali. Conboy said Saturday's operation could have been carried out by a total of 12 people, including the three bombers. And with JI's organizational links, some speculate the presumed masterminds of the strike may even have had surrogates execute their plan. "It could be that they were the strategists ... with recruits from a variety of different organizations," said Sydney Jones, a leading expert on the group. Still, the Indonesian government - which, unlike some of its neighbors, did not crack down on the group until the first Bali bombings - is feeling the heat from the failure to totally defeat Jemaah Islamiyah. Whoever is to blame, the adaptability of the Southeast Asian terrorist network poses crucial challenges to authorities. Is victory just a matter of capturing the latest two presumed leaders? Or is the movement pioneered by JI so self-sustaining that new leaders will rise to take the old ones' places? "It was clear that even with the best police work in the world and a weaker JI, you weren't going to be able to prevent an attack," said Jones. "Even if you get the two Malaysians under arrest, that's not going to mean you've eradicated terrorists." |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |