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| Europe |
| Policy Review: Security Beyond Borders |
| 2005-04-14 |
| It's an article worth reading... By Leslie S. Lebl Leslie S. Lebl is nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council of the United States. An earlier version of this article appeared as a working paper of the American Consortium on European Union Studies. After september 11, 2001, nato's invocation of Article 5 committing members to the collective defense of U.S. territory dominated news reports from Europe. Then the media reported that the U.S. government had mostly declined European offers of help, in part because the Europeans lacked useful military capabilities. The resulting hurt feelings of the Europeans, together with American doubts that the Europeans had much to contribute to the fight against terrorism, certainly soured the transatlantic relationship. That was the view from nato circles, at any rate. A different view emerged from downtown Brussels, where the European Union also responded quickly to the 9/11 attacks. Within a week, eu leaders had publicly committed themselves to closer cooperation with the United States than ever before. The United States was slow to respond, just as it had been with nato, for a variety of reasons. But the Europeans persisted, and within a short period of time a new dynamic emerged in the U.S.-eu relationship. During the years since September 2001, the United States and the European Union have signed agreements previously thought unachievable and have worked together much more closely than ever before. In fact, the breadth of the cooperation in itself contributes to the difficulty of any review and analysis. Since September 11, there have been numerous transatlantic initiatives: to develop law enforcement cooperation; to extend the freezing of terrorist assets; to develop more secure procedures for container shipping, air passenger travel and issuance of travel documents; to improve export control systems and other nonproliferation measures; and to coordinate foreign policy, especially toward the Broader Middle East. The bilateral cooperation thus included both foreign and domestic policy officials from numerous agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the number of agreements signed and meetings attended does not in itself define the quality or success of the cooperation. The substance of the agreements is important, as is the degree to which they been implemented. Further, at the outset it was not clear whether any new U.S.-eu cooperation would come at the expense of bilateral cooperation between the United States and eu member states at the national level, or whether it would indeed provide its own added value. Beyond the technical issues are wider ones associated with the goal of "building Europe." As more and more functions are concentrated in Brussels rather than in national capitals throughout Europe, it is not clear whether this will help or hurt U.S. interests. In part, the answer to that question will depend on whether the eu is able to persuade its citizens of the danger that terrorism poses to them, as well as the value of close cooperation with the United States on these issues. The United States also had to decide whether it should cooperate with the eu as a means of inducing European governments to tighten their counterterrorism regimes, or whether such cooperation might be limited and possibly damaged by public opposition with a strong tinge of anti-Americanism. In sum, the United States had to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the proposed new partnership. September 11: Before and after [..] |
| Posted by:3dc |