| Submit your comments on this article |
| Southeast Asia |
| Analysis of Thai insurgents |
| 2005-04-11 |
| EFL The details would show that despite the stepped-up counter-terrorism measures taken by the Thai authorities, the organisation or organisations responsible for the incidents have managed to maintain a continuous series of attacks at regular intervals, without, however, causing any mass casualties. The terrorists have been following a modus operandi of targeted killings of Buddhist civilians, many of them monks and teachers, and policemen and other members of the security forces involved in counter-terrorism duties as well as attempts at indiscriminate killings of civilians through the use of explosive devices. The targeted killings have generally involved the use of hand-held weapons. The weapons used were not very sophisticated. They were mostly revolvers, pistols and what in India we call country-made weapons, that is, weapons crudely fabricated locally. There have been hardly any reports of sophisticated hand-held weapons such as the AK series of rifles, which are used in large numbers by the jihadi terrorists in India and Pakistan. One has also not seen the use of hand-grenades and landmines, which are frequently used by the jihadi terrorists in India's Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as well as by the Maoists in India and Nepal. Hand-grenades are also used by the jihadi terrorists in Bangladesh. An often repeated modus operandi (MO) for targeted assassinations of individuals is for two terrorists to travel in a two-wheeler and for the one in the rear to take out a weapon and kill the target. This helps in rapid get-away after the killing without being captured by the bystanders or the police. This MO is often used by the jihadi terrorists in Pakistan, particularly by those of the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Of significance is the large number of terrorist incidents involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While the explosives used were not of severe destructive quality and could have been procured locally, the techniques used in assembling the IEDs and having them triggered off indicate some sophistication involving special training, either locally or in foreign countries. There is so far no confirmed evidence of any centralised command and control emanating from outside southern Thailand, though there is evidence of inspiration and assistance for jihadi terrorism emanating from outside---more from the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Bangladesh (HUJI-B) than from the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) of South-East Asia. Individuals from southern Thailand, in ones and twos, continue to go to Bangladesh for studying in the madrasas run by the HUJI-B and for training in jihadi terrorism. The Rohingya Muslim cadres of the HUJI-B, recruited from the Arakan area of Myanmar and trained in camps in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, are also playing an increasing role in the recruitment, motivation and training of the volunteers from southern Thailand. Bangladesh continues to be the web of terrorist funding not only in Thailand, but also increasingly in other countries of South-East Asia. An analysis of the Thai terrorist incidents indicates the following: * The terrorists emulate the post-June, 2003, example of the Iraqi resistance-fighters, who operate in small autonomous cells without the need for a noticeable organisational infrastructure and consciously refrain from claiming responsibility for their successes. In this respect, the MO of the Iraqi resistance-fighters differs from that of the pro-Al Qaeda foreign terrorists, who do not hesitate to claim successes. * The post-January, 2004, terrorists in Southern Thailand seem to belong to a mutation different from those of the 1970s and the 1980s. They are impervious to control by the traditional leaders of the Muslim community either in southern Thailand or in the adjoining areas of Malaysia. Exercises such as encouraging a group of personalities of the Nahadatul Ulema of Indonesia to tour southern Thailand in order to exercise a moderating influence on the angry Muslim youth, though laudable, are unlikely to produce results in the short and medium terms. * As has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the use of a highly-militarised counter-terrorism approach by the Americans has added to the Muslim anger and driven more youths into the welcoming arms of jihadi terrorist leaders and organisations, the apparent emulation of the American militarised approach by the Thai counter-terrorism authorities is fuelling the jihadi fire. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, in southern Thailand too, counter-terrorism as practised by the security forces has itself become a root cause of aggravation. While the recrudescence of terrorism in January, 2004, might have been due to classic reasons such as feelings of alienation of the local Muslim youth due to ethnic, economic and social factors, the counter-terrorism methods used by the Thai forces have provided a new motivating and sustaining factor. * Jihadi terrorism in southern Thailand is still in the early stages of its evolution and does not as yet command the kind of expertise and specialised capabilities which one finds in South and West Asia. There is no effective use of the Internet by the terrorists and very little evidence of the use of sophisticated PSYWAR techniques involving virulent propaganda campaigns against non-Muslims and the security forces. While the motivation of the new breed of jihadi terrorists is strengthening, it is not comparable to the level of their co-religionists in South and West Asia. The absence of confirmed instances of suicide terrorism can be attributed to this. * The jihadi terrorists of southern Thailand, who were till now avoiding attacks on tourism targets which could lead to deaths of foreigners and possibilities of the induction of foreign counter-terrorism expertise, as happened in Indonesia after the Bali explosion of October,2002, have since started attacking tourism targets such as an airport, a hotel frequented by foreign tourists, a departmental store of French origin etc.But their attacks are still confined to the Muslim majority provinces of the South and their vicinity where they are confident of local support and sanctuary. They have not so far ventured into other areas such as Bangkok, Pattaya and Phuket probably because they are not confident of similar support from the local Muslim community. |
| Posted by:Paul Moloney |
| #1 My God! Our Origami has no effect on them! Can anything stop them! |
| Posted by: tu3031 2005-04-11 9:01:48 AM |