You have commented 339 times on Rantburg.

Your Name
Your e-mail (optional)
Website (optional)
My Original Nic        Pic-a-Nic        Sorry. Comments have been closed on this article.
Bold Italic Underline Strike Bullet Blockquote Small Big Link Squish Foto Photo
Terror Networks
Belmont Club: why size and state sponsorship matter to terror networks
2004-09-23
EFL'd from a longer piece to get to the good part

. . . John Robb took at look at the September 11 network and analyzed its characteristics. The Mohammed Atta network had evolved under Darwinian pressure until it reached the form best suited for its purpose: to conduct strategic attacks against the United States of America. Robb concludes that a cell of 70 persons will answer to the purpose, yet be sparse enough to allow its members to remain in relative isolation. For example, no one member of Atta's cell knew more than five others. Moreover, the average distance between any two members was more than four persons. Crucially, but not surprisingly, this disconnected network of plotters maintained coherence by relying on a support infrastructure -- probably communications posts, safe houses, couriers -- to keep themselves from unraveling. Because security comes at a price in performance and flexibility, Robb arrives at an astounding conjecture: you can have small, operationally secure terrorist groups, but you can't have large, operationally secure cells without a state sponsor.

. . . A good starting point is to look at limits to group size within peaceful online communities on which we have extensive data -- terrorist networks are essentially geographically dispersed online communities. Chris Allen does a good job analyzing optimal group size with his critique of the Dunbar number.

His analysis (replete with examples) shows that there is a gradual fall-off in effectiveness at 80 members, with an absolute fall-off at 150 members. The initial fall-off occurs, according to Chris, due to an increasing amount of effort spent on "grooming" the group to maintain cohesion. The absolute fall-off at 150 members occurs when grooming fails to stem dissatisfaction and dissension, which causes the group to cleave apart into smaller subgroups (that may remain affiliated).

Al Qaeda may have been able to grow much larger than this when it ran physical training camps in Afghanistan. Physical proximity allowed al Qaeda to operate as a hierarchy along military lines, complete with middle management (or at least a mix of a hierarchy in Afghanistan and a distributed network outside of Afghanistan). Once those camps were broken apart, the factors listed above were likely to have caused the fragmentation we see today (lots of references to this in the news).

His last paragraph is crucial to understanding why the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the toppling of Saddam Hussein may have cripped global terrorism so badly. Without the infrastrastructure of a state sponsor, terrorism is limited to cells of about 100 members in size in order to maintain security. In the context of the current campaign in Iraq, the strategic importance of places like Falluja or "holy places" is that their enclave nature allows terrorists to grow out their networks to a larger and more potent size. Without those sanctuaries, they would be small, clandestine hunted bands. The argument that dismantling terrorist enclaves makes "America less safe than it should be in a dangerous world" inverts the logic. It is allowing the growth of terrorist enclaves that puts everyone at risk in an otherwise safe world.
Posted by:Mike

#7  Aris

Where the Olympic Games disrupted? No? Then you have your proof that AL Q and similar have been weriouly weakened.
Posted by: JFM   2004-09-23 3:19:20 PM  

#6  You have to remember that in the period before 9/11 the techniques were being perfected almost always in Afghanistan. Remember the indian airline hijack which lead to the release of Masood Azhar, that should have been a real eye opener. For the first time since 70's a State (Afghanistan) actually hosted the hijackers allowed them to complete their mission and allowed them to escape. But at that time "IT WAS A PART OF CRAZY MIDDLE EAST NOTHING TO DO WITH US"
Posted by: Fawad   2004-09-23 1:34:10 PM  

#5  "he was thinking that the World Trade Center attack was the last spectacularly big action al Qaeda has taken?"

If by "crippling global terrorism" he meant this then he is just stupid. It's the most parochial, shorteyed reason I can imagine. Not to mention its patently false.

Is Zarqawi nothing? Is Beslan nothing?

In the period before 9/11 nothing bad had happened either in America. Was Al Qaeda "crippled" then? This is a definition of crippled that nobody in their sane minds can use.

3/11 took down a whole government. Bombs in Iraq keep on killing police recruits and others by the hundreds. The Islamofascists have I-don't-know-how-many cities under their control. Sadr has been practically declared untouchable and he parades around as the new Saddam.

"9/11 shut down a world financial center for a week" ? Cost you billion of dollars? Frankly that's small potatoes compared to what's being accomplished done by terrorism since -- namely squashing the hope of Iraqi democracy to survive.
Posted by: Aris Katsaris   2004-09-23 12:30:10 PM  

#4  Lex, dear, we got the message about our new allies. Please give that bit a rest now, ok? Stick to all the rest of your commentary -- its the new insights that you bring that will soonest influence minds. Thanks much!

Aris, perhaps by "may have cripped global terrorism so badly" he was thinking that the World Trade Center attack was the last spectacularly big action al Qaeda has taken? Even the 3/11 attack in Spain, while horrific to the victims, was merely annoying to the rest of the commuters heading in to the office -- at least until they discovered why the train schedule was all screwed up. 9/11 on the other hand, shut down a world financial center for a week, and cost New York City billions of dollars, and the U.S. even more so (anyone have actual amounts?) I realize that a.Q. certainly planned more spectacles, but they haven't been able to carry them off. Otherwise I agree with your revised formulation.
Posted by: trailing wife   2004-09-23 12:03:25 PM  

#3  I agree with the importance he gives to state sponsors.

But "understanding why the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the toppling of Saddam Hussein may have cripped global terrorism so badly" seems to me bizarre -- shouldn't he have first shown us global terrorism to have been crippled, instead of taking it as an assumption?

Global terrorism doesn't seem particularly "crippled" to me.

I'd have rephrased his sentence to say instead: "His last paragraph is crucial to understanding why the survival of the Surian and Iranian regimes have prevented global terrorism from being crippled"

It's *not* about "vigorous and effective intel". It's about destroying the regimes that support Islamofascist terrorism.
Posted by: Aris Katsaris   2004-09-23 11:35:40 AM  

#2  All the more reason to shift our focus away from Europe and toward the key frontline states, which will make or break us.

Wretchard's analysis suggests that our success depends mainly on vigorous and effective intel and other help from key regional powers in disrupting these networks. Israel, Russia, India and Pak, Indonesia, etc are vastly more important to us than NATO.
Posted by: lex   2004-09-23 11:08:15 AM  

#1  The recent report of the Palestinian girl boomer that was stopped by Israeli police is another case in point. Estimates are that an effective homicide boomer operation uses approximately 90 folks in the entire chain. This chain includes: the recruiter, religious savants and psychologists, technicians with boomer background, transportation, identification/permit providers, etc.

In most cases, the boomer is a singular event, one target-one boomer. When more than two are used, there’s always the possibility the second in line will witness the first boomer turn to hash and chicken out. Here’s where the backup comes in. If either the first boomer, or the second appear to be hesitant, there’s often a cell phone actuated capability on the package, which will be initiated by the backup.

The best time to interrupt the event is in the reconnaissance and dry run stage. The participants will time the event over and over…almost zombie like.

We hear of the obvious successes and failures, but never of the many that don’t come off due to diligence by Israeli police. May God bless them!
Posted by: RN   2004-09-23 7:47:39 AM  

00:00