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| Terror Networks |
| FBI informant tipped US off about planes being used as weapons in 1993 |
| 2004-07-26 |
| In spring 1993, an FBI informant uncovered an al Qaeda-linked plan to crash an airplane into the U.S. embassy in Cairo. In testimony little noted during a 1995 court case, FBI informant Emad Salem testified that a Sudanese national, Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, asked him to assist a plot in which a Sudanese Air Force pilot would first bomb the home of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarek from his airplane then crash the plane into the American Embassy. While it appears the plot never advanced past the discussion stage, the incident is yet another case in which the U.S. government had specific information that terrorists were planning to use an airplane as a missile. According to Salem, an informant integral to FBI efforts to crack a New York terror cell in 1993, Siddig Ali asked Salem to help the alleged pilot find "gaps in the air defense in Egypt so he can drive to bomb the presidential house, and then turn around, crash the plane into the American embassy after he eject himself out of the plane (...) ." Salem was also asked to assist the pilot in escaping. Salem testified that he informed his contacts in the Egyptian government of the threat. Abdo Haggag, an Egyptian spy testifying on behalf of the U.S. government, told the court the alleged pilot received a fatwa from radical Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman approving the operation as early as 1992. The alleged pilot was not arrested or charged when the rest of Rahman-linked New York City cell was apprehended in June 1993, and it's not clear whether the plot had any credible basis. The NYC cell had numerous links to al Qaeda and is now believed to have been an al Qaeda operation. It's not clear where the alleged pilot lives now, and it's also unclear if the allegations made in court had any basis in fact. Defense lawyers during the trial claimed the supposed pilot was a U.S. cab driver and that the plot was fanciful. Ramzi Yousef, who was extensively linked to the NYC cell, also planned to crash an airplance into CIA headquarters, as part of Project Bojinka, a plot he was preparing to executive in the Philippines in 1994 and 1995 before his hideout was exposed to the authorities. The case is US v Omar Abdel Rahman, et al, S5 93 Cr. 181 (MBM), testimony of Emad Salem, March 21, 1995. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #3 Of note I believe is that, at that time (in the context of the first WolrdTrade Center bombing trials in the mid-90s), Emad Salem was widely impugned as an unreliable informant. Check out this interview with famed lefty moonbat lawyer William Kunstler, lawyer for one of hte defendants. So, I am guessing that efforts like this contributed greatly to discounting anything that Emad Salem had to say. |
| Posted by: Carl in N.H 2004-07-26 12:30:59 PM |
| #2 Could measures have realistically been put in place earlier? Probably, although given the length ot time between the "warning" and 2001 was a long seven years. Public patience with more drastic security measures absent a 9/11/2001 disaster would have worn thin rather quickly, and would have likely led to relaxation of the more strict measures or their discontinuation entirely. |
| Posted by: Bomb-a-rama 2004-07-26 11:20:29 AM |
| #1 Yup. This was one of several scenarios many agreed that Islamacist or other groups could potentially use to attack the US. But the question is, what to do with that information when it was given? We're seeing how controversial security measures can be even after 9/11. And how expensive, both to implement and in the way that they discourage some to fly at all (which has economic impacts). Could measures have realistically been put in place earlier? Which of the many potential attacks of other kinds will we conclude -- after they are successful -- that we were too lax about? Finding the right balance is going to be as much a matter of luck as of will or attention. |
| Posted by: rkb 2004-07-26 11:14:37 AM |