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| Will things go Bouteflikaâs way? |
| 2004-03-03 |
| It is the richest Arab country in terms of cash held by its government. And yet, in terms of disposable income, its people remain among the poorest. We are talking of Algeria where the government, having collected over $300 billion from oil and gas exports since 1990, holds liquid assets of over $25 billion. And, yet, this is a country where unemployment stands at over 40 percent, forcing tens of thousands of young people to immigrate to Europe each year, often through illegal channels. The capital Algiers, a sprawling metropolis of four million people, is subject to daily brownouts and shortage of water not seen even in post-liberation Baghdad. âOur country is rich but our people are poor,â runs the refrain of a current popular song. But Algeria is also one of few Arab nations where the democratic ideal enjoys genuine popular support. The period of freedom that opened between 1988 and 1992 saw the emergence of dozens of political parties, covering the entire political spectrum. Despite a government campaign to curb it in the past four years, the Algerian press, much of which is privately owned, remains one of the liveliest in the Arab world. In 1965, three years after an eight-year war of independence against France, Algeria fell under the control of a military elite that had emerged from the defunct French colonial army. The generals and their lower-rank minions in the army and security services formed a clan resembling a royal family. It imposed a one-party system, muzzled the media, and, in close association with a network of French business tycoons, claimed the lionâs share in the nationâs oil and gas income. In 1991 the generals intervened to stop the second round of a general election in which Islamist parties appeared set for a big victory. And in 1999 the generals forced the elected President Liamine Zeroual to retire before the end of his term. They then organized a snap election in which Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had spent almost 20 years in exile, was the sole candidate and won with a big majority. Putting himself at the head of the National Liberation Front (FLN), the party that had monopolized power for three decades, Bouteflika proceeded to form an objective alliance of Islamists and sections of the military against the emerging democratic movement. Last year, however, the coalition that Bouteflika had constructed began to fall apart. He first lost control of the FLN that, trying to reorganize itself as a modern left-of-center party, opposed Bouteflikaâs autocratic style. Next it was the turn of Islamists to distance themselves from the president after they realized that he was using them for his own purposes. But possibly the biggest blow to Bouteflika came late last year when the army high command publicly announced it would no longer interfere in national politics. The generalsâ decision was taken under pressure from Washington and during negotiations with Gen. Muhammad Lamari, Algeriaâs most senior commander. By the year 2000 Lamari and other Algerian generals had realized that, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union which had provided 90 percent of Algeriaâs weapons and materiel, they would need new sources of supplies. That led them into talks with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and eventually the United States. A year later, the United States, shaken by the Sept. 11 attacks, began to see Algeria as an ally in the war against terrorism. Bouteflika and Lamari were invited to Washington where discussions focused on some form of a link between NATO and Algeria. At the end of last year the idea matured into a grander plan under which Algeria would be one of five Arab states to sign a memorandum of association with NATO. (The others are Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan). The scheme is scheduled to receive approval next May at the NATO summit, to be held in Istanbul. One key condition that NATO has demanded of all the Arab states in question is that their military should stay out of politics. Thus Lamariâs recent declaration of âneutralityâ must be taken seriously. With the army stepping aside, Bouteflika, who lacks a popular base, looks to the civilian administration, led by Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahya, to ensure his victory. Although the Algerian government, like governments in other âdeveloping nationsâ, has a long experience of arranging election results, Bouteflika cannot be certain of an easy ride. The former ruling party, which has numerous supporters within the bureaucracy, is fielding its own candidate in the person of former Prime Minister Ali Benflis. Several ministers in the present coalition government are also hostile to Bouteflika as are many younger civil servants who believe the president belongs to a generation whose time has passed. Also, with at least five other candidates already in the field, Bouteflika is unlikely to be the only choice as in 1999. His hope is that he would collect enough votes in the first round of voting in April to be able to contest the second and final round in which only the two candidates with the highest numbers of votes remain in the field. Bouteflika also hopes that the man to face him in the second round would be Abdallah Jaballah, an Islamist firebrand who was once close to the Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama Bin Laden and the Sudanese leader Hassan Al-Turabi. In such a situation, so goes Bouteflikaâs analysis, most Algerians would have no choice but to hold their noses and vote for him. Bouteflika would thus repeat Jacques Chiracâs experience in the French presidential election of 2002 when he won 80 percent of the votes because the man who faced him in the second round was the neo-fascist Jean-Marie Le Pen. Will things work out as Bouteflika has imagined? Nothing is less certain. Despite its many setbacks in the past four years, the Algerian democratic movement remains deep-rooted and could still put up a good fight with a single candidate of unity against both Bouteflika and the Islamists. It is in the long-term interest of the Western democracies, including the United States, to encourage the emergence of a genuine democratic choice in Algeria where political oppression and elite corruption are among the causes of a violence that, in its worst form, translates into terrorism. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #2 But possibly the biggest blow to Bouteflika came late last year when the army high command publicly announced it would no longer interfere in national politics. IMO dogs will stop chasing cats & pigs will be menacing airliners before Algerian Generals stop interfering in politics. What's Khalid Nezzar up to these days? |
| Posted by: Dave 2004-3-3 7:11:23 PM |
| #1 The capital Algiers, a sprawling metropolis of four million people, is subject to daily brownouts and shortage of water not seen even in post-liberation Baghdad. snicker in close association with a network of French business tycoons, claimed the lionâs share in the nationâs oil and gas income. It's all about the oiiiillll. But possibly the biggest blow to Bouteflika came late last year when the army high command publicly announced it would no longer interfere in national politics. We want power and you can't give it to us. The generalsâ decision was taken under pressure from Washington and during negotiations with Gen. Muhammad Lamari, Algeriaâs most senior commander. gigs up, pal Bouteflika and Lamari were invited to Washington where discussions focused on some form of a link between NATO and Algeria. Huh? I thought Buttafuco Boy was the tyrant here and the generals were our allies ...I'm confused. What did Washington say to him? "Our way or the highway", or maybe, "Bouteflika, Bouteflika, fly away home??" Bouteflika.. repeat[s] Jacques Chiracâs experience in the French presidential election ..when he won ..because the man who faced him in the second round was the neo-fascist Jean-Marie Le Pen. It's an old trick..but it works every time. Krgystan and Bouteflika all in one night. A lot's has been going on under the radar here. Darn..I need some sleep. |
| Posted by: B 2004-3-3 1:42:35 AM |