When Saddam Hussein was finally captured in December, Fathel, a onetime leader of the Fedayeen and now a resistance leader, got a special message. The game has changed, he was told, and they had to change as well. "Our leaders ordered that we should meet and adapt ourselves to this new situation and to remove Iraqi people who were agents of the US," Fathel said. "They also told us that our work must be more organized and more secret because there are spies among us." Three weeks after Saddam Hussein was caught, the Iraqi resistance has remained as intractable as ever, even as the coalition stepped up an aggressive campaign to wipe out insurgents in Baghdad.
| Only Polyanna would have thought the activity would drop off precipitately. There should be — and has been — a surge, followed by a gradual diminution of activity as the Bad Guys' resources are expended. It'll level out at a much lower plateau as the financing shifts from Sammy's millions to the emigrees they talk about below... |
Threats of a "Christmas Surprise" came true this week as a barrage of rockets, mortars and suicide bombings throughout the country left more than 10 US soldiers dead, countless Iraqis dead or injured and the general security situation still in jeopardy. The skies over Baghdad rumbled with explosions and artillery fire, most of it aimed at Coalition targets and several civilian targets. Rebels launched a series of synchronized rocket, mortar, gunfire and bomb attacks in Baghdad — the most serious insurgent action since Saddam's capture, hitting the Sheraton Palace hotel in Baghdad on two occasions and the CPA's "Green Zone". Nobody was killed and the military dismissed the insurgent offensive as a "random and irresponsible" terrorist act.
| The Baathists have lost a lot of their controllers in the past week or two. There was a lot of value in Sammy's briefcase, but they had to be hit quickly, before they could evaporate... |
In the meantime, the coalition went on the offensive with operation Iron Grip, launching a barrage on successive nights against suspected resistance targets in the south of Baghdad. Heavy machine gun fire, artillery and missile fire underscored a sense of a city still at war. But as the barrage continued overhead, Fathel was undeterred as he sat comfortably at home. In a rare look into the Fedayeen command, the former commander underscored a level of organization and planning that continues to drive the resistance. "The resistance will never end," he warned confidently.
| Perhaps. But it will never win, either. |
A day before Baghdad fell last April, Fathel received clear unexpected orders from his superiors. "Send your family away and rent a house in the outskirts of Baghdad," he was told. A new stage in the war was to begin. The Fedayeen leadership was told to lay low and quiet; their commanders would know where to find them, and messengers would travel back and forth relaying orders, advice and news. Two weeks after the fall of the regime, Fathel was ordered to head to Ramadi to meet Saddam Hussein, he thought. As it turned out, Saddam never showed. But the ragtag gang of onetime military leaders were told that Saddam was well and that he encouraged all to lead the resistance against the US troops. A week later, "They divided us into groups and told us that together these groups would make up what was called Mohammad's Second Army," Fathel said. "After that we carried out many plans and operations."
| We've seen lots of them here, ignored even more of them. That was a background noise of guerrilla warfare, important only in the aggregate, except to the unfortunates involved in them. |
In June, Fathel received the next major order: he was to sell everything and in particular the cars, houses and lands that the government had given him and await new orders. With cash in hand, he waited for further word. Then one day it came — Fathel was ordered to head to Amman for yet another meeting. "When I went to Amman I was shocked by the numbers of my colleagues and friends from the Baath socialist party there, as well as the presence of many of the ex-security men," he admitted.
| Hmmm... This section is pretty interesting. I've redacted the article pretty heavily, but there's some nice meat in this section if you feel like reading the whole thing... |
"They told me that they had gone to Jordan after the fall of Baghdad and continued to prepare operations from there and had stayed in touch with Saddam's family, many of whom were now in Jordan." Numerous former Baathis flooded Jordan's capital during the summer months, many of them with cash in hand ready to buy real estate and more.
| Settling in to set up their control center free from interference by the Merkins... |
In ritzy Amman neighborhoods like Deir Ghbar new buildings have risen in recent months fetching some of the highest prices in Amman. The buildings are full of members of Saddam Hussein's former regime and their compatriots, including high ranking former Baathis either unknown to or not wanted by the Coalition. The most famous Iraqis in town, Saddam Hussein's daughters Raghad and Rana, are also getting on with life in a three-storey white stone guesthouse in the Royal Palace that used to belong to the late King Hussein.
| Somebody should be interested in this bit. Sammy's daughters receiving refuge can be viewed as professional courtesy. The emigree community is another matter. They're too close to the action to be harmless, like San Francisco's Russians were, or Los Angeles' Persians... |
Fathel describes an intricate resistance network that is more a series of bee colonies than a centrally controlled army.
| That means it's tough to break up, but also impossible to coordinate — unless you travel to Jordan regularly for "business meetings." |
Messages are transferred by trusted messengers who know how to reach individual members. The cells operate relatively independently and freely, so that the arrest or killing of one will not affect the others. But there are even far more secretive procedures that Fathel would not discuss. Ultimately, those secrets lie at the heart of the continued intractable resistance, for which military might still appears a losing strategy.
| Military might is only a part of the strategy. Intelligence has to be the driver, and whether the military or the police or the local librarian is the tool to shut them down is a matter or circumstance. Rising prosperity will be what eventually causes these ghosts of the past to vanish. |
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