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| Iran |
| Iran’s Forthcoming Parliamentary Elections Up for Grabs |
| 2003-11-25 |
| EFL Siamak Namazi So confident are Iranian conservatives three months before the country’s February 20, 2004 parliamentary elections that, in the words of one right-wing strategist, they have stopped talking about how to beat reformist candidates and begun to plan "how to run the nation.". Their optimism, which finds glum echoes in Western analysts’ predictions of a conservative takeover, is misplaced. It is too soon to call the outcome of the February vote, and too soon to conclude, as Washington hawks may have done, that Iranians’ hopes for peaceable reforms are doomed. The prognosticators’ crystal balls proved foggy before the February 2003 nationwide municipal elections as well. While most expected a serious drop in voter turnout, almost no one imagined that so few (10 to 15 percent of eligible voters) would exercise their franchise in the major cities. In the years since the 1979 revolution, Iranians have gone to the polls in large numbers. The lowest turnout in a parliamentary contest, elections for the First Majles (Assembly) in 1980, was 52 percent. During the last parliamentary elections in 2000, a time when hope for change ran high, approximately 70 percent of voters took part. Past patterns show that people in the provinces vote in accordance with personal, ethnic, tribal and family affiliations. But as seasoned social scientists have pointed out, residents of provincial areas also tend to emulate the behavior of people in larger cities, especially Tehran. It appears that at least some residents of smaller cities were surprised that Tehranis boycotted the local council elections to such a large extent. Iran boasts one of the youngest populations in the world, with roughly two thirds (and counting) of its people under 30, as well as one of the lowest voting ages. Men and women aged 16 and over are allowed to take part in national elections. The young flocked to voice their preferences in the two presidential elections of 1997 and 2001, as well as in the 2000 parliamentary elections, when they helped to ensure the reformist bloc’s margin of victory. During the 2000 race, the conservative Guardian Council -- an unelected body that has the power, under the Iranian constitution, to block bills passed by the Majles threatened to subject the majority of reformist candidates to an ideological vetting process. More importantly, the reformists are increasingly concerned about conservative surveillance of their strategy sessions. Mohammad Reza Khatami, leader of the reformist party Mosharekat and the president’s brother, was quoted in the Iran newspaper saying that "we see among ourselves that all of our meeting rooms are bugged and all of our members are followed..." The syllogism the reformists have used is not hard to understand. The hawks in Washington and Tel Aviv, they argue, believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a house of cards. Iranians are so frustrated with the regime, the hawks calculate, that, with a bit of encouragement, they will rise up and dispose of clerical rule. Hence, the "external enemy" can be expected to continue exerting pressure to keep the regime on a crisis footing, while sending messages of support for the Iranian people’s fight for freedom and democracy. [But if voter turnout in 2004 and 2005 is high,] the reformists’ logic continues, the Washington hawks are bound to be discredited, and the White House will be more likely to adjust its stance toward engagement and dialogue. The reformists’ political opponents, therefore, face a challenge in deciding where their best interest lies. A dramatic fall in voter turnout will favor the conservatives’ electoral chances; the last local council elections proved that they can count on their supporters to show up, while the reformist voters stay home. Taha Hashemi, an editor of the moderate conservative paper Entekhab, puts it this way: "If the world faces a regime whose most important election — the parliamentary elections — has little public backing, it will make all efforts to settle its scores with that regime." He continues: "Some incorrectly believe that appeasing America and expediting discussions whose outcome is not known could save us from this situation. But this is wishful thinking because [the Americans] will not talk to us from an equal position based on respect." Khamenei’s own statement in October is the best evidence for the reformists’ success in emphasizing the importance of mass participation. "What is important to me in the first place is the people’s presence in the elections," he said, adding, "who makes it to the parliament is in second place." The reformist leaders admonish prospective voters that boycotting the elections can only result in a conservative resurgence, hence risking a return to the more closed public space of the pre-Khatami days. The reformists point to the program of Tehran’s new hard-line mayor, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who has cracked down on the formerly liberal granting of concert licenses and apparently plans to close down many cultural centers in favor of Quran recitation halls. The people’s choice, like that of the more radical reformers, might be between bad and worse, but keeping the reformist faction in power at least offers limited hope and requires minimum energy: simply turn out and vote. The message itself could be an effective one, particularly if councils in conservative-controlled cities persist in implementing policies that are unpopular with the youth. There are rumors that military leaders affiliated with the right-wing faction will enter their names in the Majles elections. Perhaps the conservatives believe that Iranians will view military men as strong, disciplined politicians who can cut through bureaucratic red tape. The reformists are crying foul, reminding their opponents that the constitution expressly bans the presence of the military in politics. Of course, a commander who quits his post by a certain date is legally allowed to run. But, warn the reformists, such a commander might instruct subordinates to transport his former troops to the polls — giving himself a built-in electoral advantage. The forthcoming parliamentary elections, in short, are up for grabs. Plenty of evidence indicates that Iranians are frustrated with the inability of the reform movement to overcome conservative stonewalling; indeed, this is a major reason why voter participation plummeted in 2003. If recent voting patterns hold, in February 2004 the conservatives might be able to secure most seats in about ten major cities. Still, the reformists have a fair chance of winning a majority of seats in the rest of Iran. The Seventh Majles could therefore be more pluralistic, with more factions represented and more independent MPs, but the reformist bloc would retain its voice in the legislature. Yet the addition of millions of newly eligible voters each year and the tendency for Tehran to be a model of behavior for other parts of the nation are enough to cast doubt on the reliability of previous elections as an indicator of future results. |
| Posted by:Lucky |
| #3 note that the "reformists' pushing for high turnout in the above article are moderate followers of Khatami, who look for limited lifestyle improvements "more concert halls" and try to appeal to the hardliners on the ground that a more broadly based regime would be stronger against the West. It seems that this only adds to the reasons the genuine democrats and radical reformers have for boycotting the election, since 'the "external enemy" ...exerting pressure to keep the regime on a crisis footing, while sending messages of support for the Iranian people’s fight for freedom and democracy' seems to be their best hope. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2003-11-25 1:21:19 PM |
| #2 Took me an hour. It's about half. |
| Posted by: Lucky 2003-11-25 12:53:46 PM |
| #1 Didn't look too EFL too me. |
| Posted by: Bill 2003-11-25 12:48:09 PM |