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| Iraq |
| The Iraq Bush will build |
| 2003-02-09 |
| Long article from the Guardian. In the early evening the citizens of the southern Iraqi city of Basra like to walk along the banks of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Tall palms sway in the breeze that comes off the muddy brown water. Children run between the statues of war heroes. This is one of the fabled cities of the Middle East. But only a few hundred yards from the waterside, the real face of Basra the Beautiful, as the fading postcards on display in the lobby of the city's only hotel call it, is revealed. In the back streets, mangy dogs forage in piles of rotting rubbish, effluent courses down gutters hacked in the muddy streets, and families of 20 are crammed into three-room houses. In these homes, away from prying ears, two questions are being asked: What happens in the war? And what happens afterwards? Most people know the answer to the first. Even Saddam Hussein admits the technological superiority of the forces ranged against him will make meaningful resistance hard. Actually he hasn't, but continue. There is little incentive to fight for even the officers of the elite Republican Guard, let alone the conscripts who will face the Joint Direct Attack Munitions and the Apaches with weapons as old as Iraq's tourist literature. But the answer to the second? Even those charged with orchestrating Iraq's post-Saddam future have little idea. Every Thursday morning for many weeks the inner circle of President George Bush's administration - Condoleezza Rice, his National Security Adviser; Colin Powell, the Secretary of State; Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary; senior figures from the CIA - have gathered in the White House's Oval Office for a progress meeting on the 'war on terror'. There was one question an increasingly frustrated Bush asked every week: once the allies had got rid of Saddam, 'what do we do with Iraq?' He has been getting conflicting answers. Infighting within the administration continues. However, a scheme, finally, has been thrashed out. The plan is in three stages: first, US-led military rule; second, a transitional phase with an American military governor ruling alongside a civilian leader appointed by (or at least acceptable to) the international community; and, finally, handover to a regime sympathetic to and nurtured by Washington. Initially, the model for post-war Iraq was that of Japan's reconstruction under General Douglas MacArthur. But State Department experts felt this would be too brazenly colonial and cause resentment throughout the Arab world. However, although the MacArthur-style scheme has been discarded, a key resource for the planners is the archives of the denazification of Germany. As it was with post-war Germany, it will be unfeasible to purge Iraq of all members of the Baath Party, Saddam's political vehicle. 'Millions of people are complicit. If they were all rounded up, the administration of the country would collapse. These are people who will be needed in any post-war situation,' Daniel Neep, of the Royal United Services Institute in London, said. Sounds like George Patton's complaint after the war, too many Nazis rounded up and no one left to run Germany. Turned out he was wrong, and this is prolly wrong too. Round 'em up and make 'em sweat a while. The US military governor of Iraq is likely to be Tommy Franks, the general due to head the attack on Iraq. This is not entirely the promotion it seems: Rumsfeld is known to dislike Franks for his strategic conservatism. Don: "Congrats, Tommy, I've appointed you to a five year term as governor-viceroy of Iraq." Tommy: "With all due respect Mr. Secretary ..." Don: "Shaddup or I'll make it ten years." The first phase, US-led military rule, would last between six and 18 months after the war. It would be policed by armies from the 'coalition of the willing', including a big British contingent. The Brits know the place pretty well, we should let them lead. The second phase is seen as being a kind of international civilian administration, backed by a diminished military presence. Here, the inspiration being worked on is the protectorate in Kosovo. Bad idea. Keep phase I in place until the Iraqis are ready to handle it. Otherwise the Kruds and the Shi'a will get crazy ideas into their heads about splitting off. But if the Americans are hoping for a broad, UN-led international coalition to take on the task of running Iraq, the United Nations is dreading the role. Officials at UN headquarters speak about having to 'clean up the mess ' at the end of a war which may not have been sanctioned by the Security Council. If they don't sanction it, they won't have anything to worry about. We won't let them in afterwards. This will really upset the French since all their oil contracts will go poof. 'In American logic, the UN seems to have an advisory role when it comes to making war, the easy part; but becomes essential when it comes to making peace, i.e. the difficult part,' said one official. Don't be too sure of that. There is bitter argument over who should be the prospective civilian governor, or 'High Representative', to rule alongside an American during the second phase. The Americans want an American. The veteran peace-broker George Mitchell, with his experience in Ireland and the Middle East, is a front-runner. But the Bush administration sees Mitchell, a Democrat, as too much of a dove. It favours Norman Schwarzkopf, who led coalition forces in the first Gulf war and is now, as a civilian, a vigorous campaigner for the Bush family. Heh, ‘Stormin' Norman’? That would really pin some ears back. But most Security Council members would prefer an appointment from a European Union country to counter American influence. The UN is determined, in the face of fierce US opposition, that Iraq's top civilian 'must' be a Muslim. Lakhdar Brahimi, the veteran Algerian diplomat who brokered peace in Afghanistan, is a possibility. The UNSC had better give us 10 votes and no veto then, or they can wish for anyone they want; it won't happen. The third phase of reconstruction is the most controversial and least planned: the establishment of a pro-American Iraqi government, ideally within two years, that eschews the nation's recent past and, of course, weapons of mass destruction. The latter is more controversial than it sounds, as chemical weapons have been a corner-stone of Iraqi military strategy for two decades. It won't be anymore. Reconciling Iraq's powerful Sunni Muslim minority, its poor Shia majority and its semi-autonomous Kurds will be hard. So, too, will it be to convince Iraqis that the government is ruling in their best interests and is not a US puppet. Let's see: we'll make sure the bandits are put down, the Iranians keep out, the oil money gets spent on rebuilding the country, the worst of the Baathist pigs swing from a rope — what's not to like if you're an Iraqi afterwards? Dick Cheney, the US Vice-President, and the Pentagon have long been pushing for a robust role for the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a motley collection of exiled leaders led by Ahmed Chalabi. But the CIA and State Department distrust the INC, regarding it as self-serving and lacking credibility among Iraqis. They're right They want to build a government from people now in Iraq once reconstruction is under way. The State Department is hoping to reassure former Baath party figures by stressing that it wants to prosecute only a dozen or so leading figures in the Saddam regime, while setting up a truth and reconciliation commission along South African lines to deal with amnesty for the rest. We should prosecute the top thousand or so. And anyone with the rank of "General." The key unknown for the third stage is the state of Iraq after the war. A document prepared for the State Department predicts 'disruption of law and order, the food distribution systems and emergency healthcare'. Fear would be 'widespread,' says the government report. So, experts say, would 'score-settling'. A secret UN memo, leaked to the press, forecasts 'devastation'. Injuries and trauma could, says the report, 'devastate' the population, with up to 500,000 needing treatment. 'The outbreak of disease, in epidemic if not pandemic proportions, is very likely.' The last Gulf war triggered an exodus of 1.5 million refugees. Aid agencies are warning of a humanitarian catastrophe. The current strategy is to try to contain refugees within the region. I think this won't be as bad as they make it sound, but we'd better have a plan. So where does Britain fit into this? Whitehall has identified several risks in a post-Saddam scenario in addition to the outbreak of bloody civil war along ethnic lines or, if the planned 'smart bombing' campaign misses its targets, devastating damage to Iraq's infrastructure. Planners fear retreating Iraqi soldiers will ignite oil wells as they did in Kuwait 12 years ago, and, if Saddam deploys chemical weapons, the poisoning of land and people on a massive scale. British planners are also concerned that Washington and London are committed to a lengthy, difficult and hugely expensive peacekeeping operation after the fighting. The oil trust will pay for it as part of the security we provide to the new Iraqi state. Think of it as a service charge. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the Chief of Defence Staff, is understood to have told Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon that it would be unreasonable to expect Britain to take the lead for much longer than a few months. 'We simply do not have the people to provide long-term support,' said one defence source. We should get the East European axis of eagles prepared to help -- the Poles, Romanians and Hungarians for starters. It would be good training for their troops to work with ours, and they can participate in something that will pay dividends in their future dealings with us. Downing Street appears to be listening: sources say that, while the commitment of troops will be 'more than six weeks, probably more than six months', there are no plans for an extended stay. In a signal that Washington understands the problem, Bush has begun in domestic speeches to warn that American troops will take longer than they expect to get home. But there are no other candidates for leading the peacekeeping operations. British planners talk privately about the Jordanians or the Turks taking the lead. Experts say that either idea is a non-starter. Neither of these; they definitely have their own plans. One answer may be using carrot rather than stick. Last November the Ministry of Defence sent a group of defence intelligence officers to Washington. They recommended flooding the country with aid in the crucial first two months after the toppling of Saddam. An intensive outpouring of food, welfare assistance, healthcare, educational opportunities and help with agriculture might convince the Iraqis that life under a Western puppet regime was preferable to any alternative. Establishing 'safe havens' within which NGOs can start work would be a priority for advancing troops. The likely costs of aid for Iraq are still being calculated. The US Congressional Budget Office estimates a peacekeeping force of 75,000 to 200,000 would cost between $17 billion and $46bn a year. Britain expects to contribute 5 per cent of the international bill. Given the parlous state of the oil infrastructure, it will be years before revenues from Iraq's own resources will be able to defray any costs. Yale economist William Nordhaus says that, even if the oilfields are intact and Iraq can produce three million barrels a day - its previous maximum - swiftly, this would produce only 'around $25 billion a year at prevailing oil prices'. As long as everyone behaves, that should be enough to cover our direct costs and the rebuilding. Much depends on Iraq's neighbours. A steady flow of high-grade intelligence from Tehran proved unexpectedly helpful during the 2001 war in Afghanistan. But the Iranians' reward was to be lumped in with North Korea and Iraq in Bush's 'axis of evil' speech. Britain has been trying to soothe injured Iranian feelings ever since. Last week Iran's Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, slipped into Downing Street for an audience with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. They assured him there would be no redrawing of Iraq's borders to Iran's disadvantage. But other regional powers, such as the Jordanians and the Saudis, are still uneasy. You don't say. Can't imagine why. Last week negotiations continued between US envoys, who want to use southern Turkey as a launchpad for 20,000 to 80,000 troops, and the Turks. Istanbul wants to pour its own troops into northern Iraq in the event of a US attack. The Kurds are horrified at the thought of a de facto occupation. And no one can predict what will happen in Israel. All Washington's calculations depend on a quick war and an easy victory. 'There's an assumption that the Americans will be greeted as liberators, and very little consideration of the deep anti-American sentiment as the result of 10 years of poverty due to the sanctions', one UN official said. This fellow is talking through his hat. We'll be liberators, all right. 'No decisive policy is without its risks,' retorted a senior US official. |
| Posted by:Steve White |
| #3 they want a muslim - you could of course have someone who is BOTH a muslim AND an AMERICAN. thsi fellow Khalilzad, who was our point man on Afgan politics, and is now Admin point man on Iraq politics - a long time Bush loyalist, very adroit, and definitely a MUSLIM. Somehow thats not what the UN people have in mind, i suspect. If it cant be an American (and i suppose a Kuwait is out), how about an Afgan??? |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2003-02-10 08:48:03 |
| #2 MB likes the thought of Stormin' Norman; she had the same thought last week. As to those grifting on Saddam's payroll: they'll just have to learn what unemployment really means, the poor dears! |
| Posted by: MommaBear 2003-02-09 15:22:58 |
| #1 Yes we will be liberators to most of the Kurds and Shia. However, a big question mark is the Sunni center of the country. In some towns in the Sunni center, the number of Baathist thugs who deserve capital punishment is pretty low and the number of people who hate Saddam is high. However, in other towns, a majority of the male adults are on Saddam's payroll in one way or another. |
| Posted by: mhw 2003-02-09 14:06:38 |