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Strategy of terror...
2003-01-07
Our visit from the Vain French Guy yesterday, commenting on my comments on Jake Tapper's article in the Weekly Standard got me thinking about Algeria and the mechanics of terrorism. An article in Foreign Affairs in the July, 1975, issue by David Fromkin, touches on the actual workings of terrorism. Fromkin's point is that terrorism depends not so much on what the terrorist does as how his adversary reacts to it, and one of the examples he uses is that of Algeria — sorry for the heft of this quote...
For, in Algeria, the whole question was one of persuasion. The problem initially faced by the miniscule band of Algerian nationalists that called itself the National Liberation Front... was that Algeria at that time had little sense of national identity. Its population was not homogeneous; and the Berbers, the Arabs, and the settlers of European descent were peoples quite different from one another. The name and separate existence of Algeria were only of recent origin. For most of recorded history, Algeria had been no more than the middle part of North Africa... Legally it was merely the southern part of France. The French had treated Morocco and Tunisia as protectorates, with separate identities, but not Algeria, which was absorbed into France herself. With sarcasm, Frenchmen used to reply to Americans who urged independence for Algeria by saying that, on the same basis, the United States should set Wisconsin free or give back independence to South Carolina.

It was a jibe that went to the heart of the matter... If Algeria was a nation, then inevitably it would be set free to govern itself. Only if it were genuinely a part of France could it continue to be ruled from Paris. All depended, therefore, on whether the indigenous population could be convinced by the French government that Algeria was not a separate country, or upon whether they could be persuaded by the FLN to change their minds so as to think of themselves as a nation.

The FLN strategy of terrorism addressed itself to this central and decisive issue... What the FLN did was to goad the French into reacting in such a way as to demonstrate the unreality of the claim that there was no distinct Algerian nation. Unlike the Irgun, the FLN did not set out to campaign merely against property; it attacked people. It used random violence, planting bombs in market places and in other crowded locations. The instinctive French reaction was to treat all persons of non-European origin as suspects; but, as Raymond Aron was to write, "As suspects, all the Muslims felt excluded from the existing community." Their feeling was confirmed when, in the middle 1950s, the authorities further reacted by transferring the French army units composed of Muslim Algerian troops out of Algeria and into mainland France, and replacing them in Algeria by European troops. By such actions they showed in the most unmistakable way that they regarded no Algerians as Frenchmen except for the European settlers. They spoke of we and us, and of they and them, and did not realize that their doing so meant the end of Algerie Francaise.

Thus the French conceded the issue of the war at its very outset. They threw away the potential support of Muslim Algeria because they were skeptical of the possibility that it could be obtained. From that moment the conclusion of the conflict was foregone. Once the sympathies of the population had shifted to its side, the FLN was able to outgrow mere terrorism and to organize a campaign of guerrilla warfare... Even though the FLN had written the script, the French, with suicidal logic, went ahead to play the role for which they had been cast.
These things stick with you. I've been lugging that particular copy of Foreign Affairs around with me since I bought it new. There are two streams that flow from the Algerian experience as Fromkin describes it:

The first is that much of the mechanism that was set up by the FLN has endured into Algeria today. The FIS, the GAI, and the Salafists all figure that if it worked for the FLN, it's going to work for them. The FLN divided Algerian society into "us" and "them," then let the Frenchies overreact to help them move the majority of the locals into the "us" category. "Us" and "them" today consists of Islamists and everybody else, with the government in theory moving the majority into the Islamist camp by overreacting. Whether this will work or not in the end, I don't know — I simply don't know enough about Algeria's internal workings. But one of the other examples Fromkin used is Israel's Irgun, which did itself in by going too far and losing public support. GAI's and the Salafists' penchant for cutting throats and wiping out entire families would seem to make that likely, but then Algeria does have that tradition of mindless violence that the FLN so kindly began. Do Algerians really consider that normal behavior, part of the natural order of things, because it's been going on for 50 years?

The second stream to flow from the article is that of the objectives of terrorism. Fromkin addresses some of the terror groups who didn't understand the way the mechanism is supposed to work — the American domestic terrorists and the IRA in Britain, who were determined to force the two countries into overreacting and showing the police state that lay beneath the smiling mask of liberal democracy. It turned out it wasn't a mask. In Argentina, it was a different story, and local vigilantes did in the bad guys — incidentally, that's what I think will eventually resolve the Algerian problem, though I probably won't live to see it. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros did succeed in turning a liberal democracy into a police state. The police state then wiped them out, and there was no popular uprising to sweep the commies into power.

Terrorism works in a limited set of circumstances. The Paleostinians haven't been able to turn their little corner of the world into "us" and "them," because there's no room in their definition of "us" for the Jews. The Jews have nowhere to go — they're not colonists, they're defending their home. The Paleos end up trying to set up the break on a wider stage. The world tut-tuts, but there's nothing The International Community™ can do. Yasser's and Sheikh Yassin's thugs end up instead fighting the Israelis head-to-head, and the Israelis are stronger. Another push like last April, and the PNA will be no more, with Hamas not too far behind.

Bin Laden and his Soddy backers are doing the same thing on an even larger scale, taking on the entire western world. Had Binny not jumped the gun in 2001, had the Soddy purchase of Islam world-wide gone on for another twenty years, they would have had a significant Muslim fifth column in place. But I don't think they have the strength yet, not even in France and the Netherlands. They're trying to do "us" and "them," but their "us" is too weak; they don't have the numbers on their side. Part of this is provincialism — they look around in Arabia and there are Muslims as far as the eye can see. They look around in Pakistan and there are Muslims in every corner. But a significant minority in Europe isn't the same thing as a sizable force, and they don't even have that in North America. Even worse for them, people have noticed, and the Islamist minorities are being watched. The other part of Binny's and the Soddies' mistake is misunderstanding the mechanics of terrorism, confusing it with guerrilla warfare, and then confusing both with conventional warfare. They're waving Kalashnikovs — small arms — in a world in which real, genuine warfare is carried out with high-performance aircraft and heavy divisions. They're also making the classic mistake of confusing men with guns with real soldiers. If all goes well for us, Binny's enthusiasm for corpses may end up costing them everything they have, to include their religion.
Posted by:Fred Pruitt

#2  Steve Den Beste had some similar comments about the Palestinians on his website. Great minds running in similar channels?
Posted by: Mike   2003-01-08 05:27:00  

#1  Excellent article, Fred. One remark : the Muslim fifth column will probably capture Belgium first, not France (even if they constitute more than 10 % of the population) or the Netherlands (where they aren't that numerous and Turks constitute the majority of muslim immigrants; besides the Netherlands have lots of immigrants like the Moluccans who still have an account to settle with muslims).

Belgium is important to them, because of Brussels. The islamofascists think like Napoleon : what truly matters, is capturing the capital city. Almost half of the population of Brussels are North African muslims, the islamofascist networks are concentrated there (thanks to a tacit agreement with the Belgian government) and now a Lebanese agent has organized the local FLN and is ready to take over power.

I think the EU will find its capital to be situated in an Islamic Republic before the end of this decade.
Posted by: Peter   2003-01-08 04:05:19  

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