Cathy and Garland point me toward an article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution by staff writer Jay Bookman: "Bush's real goal in Iraq." Mr. Bookman at times seems to have ingested something of unknown origin, and the article is eight and a half miles long, not all of it coherent. Sorry for the heft. Some of the highlights: The official story on Iraq has never made sense. The connection that the Bush administration has tried to draw between Iraq and al-Qaida has always seemed contrived and artificial. In fact, it was hard to believe that smart people in the Bush administration would start a major war based on such flimsy evidence.
The pieces just didn't fit. Something else had to be going on; something was missing. The imputation here is that because Mr. Bookman can't understand what's going on, no one else can. This is a bad sign. Usually, if most of us don't understand something, we either ask someone who does, work a little harder to get all the elements and see what we've missed, or some combination of the two. Not so Bookman, who finds... a conspiracy. This war, should it come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years or more in the making, carried out by those who believe the United States must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming the "American imperialists" that our enemies always claimed we were. Those dastards! That immediately makes me wonder who the bad guys might be, which will of course be Bush and his motley crÃŒe of nascent imperialists. Once that is understood, other mysteries solve themselves. For example, why does the administration seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is toppled? Our lack of concern could stem from the fact that we don't really care what the Iraqis do once they're rid of Saddam. Since Bush and his team, rightly or wrongly, see the problem as Saddam and his gang of goons, rather than the Iraqi people, we're assuming they'll be just as happy to get rid of him as we are to see the end of him. They can have a king, they can have a democracy, they can have an oligarchy, they can have another dictator. What concerns us is that they don't have another Saddam. What's so complicated about that? It's not our country — they should be free to screw it up any way they please. But, no... Because we won't be leaving. Having conquered Iraq, the United States will create permanent military bases in that country from which to dominate the Middle East, including neighboring Iran.
In an interview Friday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld brushed aside that suggestion, noting that the United States does not covet other nations' territory. That may be true, but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have major bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq. That's quite true, but we don't use those major bases to rule the two countries. They were there because of the Soviet Union, and troop strengths in both countries have been drawn down considerably since the Soviet Union's collapse. We also conquered Italy, and we have a fairly major naval base or two there. But we didn't conquer Spain, and we have one there, too. Slight confusion in cause and effect here, since the one's not tied to the other. And why has the administration dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as we had the Soviet Union for 45 years? Because even if it worked, containment and deterrence would not allow the expansion of American power. Besides, such tactics are beneath us as an empire. Rome did not stoop to containment; it conquered. And so, the thinking goes, should we. In some cases Rome conquered, and in others peoples willingly joined the empire. Containment doesn't work against Iraq because its leader is unstable. He's a loon. And the "containment" of the Soviets was dicey at times. Among the architects of this would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and powerful people who now hold key positions in the Bush administration: They envision the creation and enforcement of what they call a worldwide "Pax Americana," or American peace. But so far, the American people have not appreciated the true extent of that ambition. Benighted as they are, they just don't realize. It takes a first-class mind, for instance a writer for a major southern newspaper, to see the full implications. To address the terrorism threat, the president's report lays out a newly aggressive military and foreign policy, embracing pre-emptive attack against perceived enemies. It speaks in blunt terms of what it calls "American internationalism," of ignoring international opinion if that suits U.S. interests. "The best defense is a good offense," the document asserts. That stems from a surprise attack that killed 3000 Americans. "Surprise attack" means without warning. Eight years of random missile fire and blood-curdling threats from Clinton and Madame Albright didn't deter them. As recently as last June, an al-Qaeda spokesman was warning America to "fasten its seatbelt" for more of the same. Apparently dismantling Afghanistan's terrorist regime did nothing to deter them. It would seem to make sense to take an "internationalist" approach and preemptively destroy major threats to the nation. All the alternatives risk a repetition of the events of 9-11. If there is a repetition, the editorial staff of a major southern newspaper isn't going to beat its breast and say "where did we go wrong?" It's going to demand to know why the nation wasn't protected. The report's repeated references to terrorism are misleading, however, because the approach of the new National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the events of Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same language in a report issued in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century, a group of conservative interventionists outraged by the thought that the United States might be forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in history has the international security order been as conducive to American interests and ideals," the report said. "The challenge of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American peace.' " This is where the conspiracy theory comes in... Overall, that 2000 report reads like a blueprint for current Bush defense policy. Most of what it advocates, the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For example, the project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty and a commitment to a global missile defense system. The administration has taken that course.
It recommended that to project sufficient power worldwide to enforce Pax Americana, the United States would have to increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross domestic product to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the Bush administration has requested a defense budget of $379 billion, almost exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.
It advocates the "transformation" of the U.S. military to meet its expanded obligations, including the cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the Crusader artillery system. That's exactly the message being preached by Rumsfeld and others.
It urges the development of small nuclear warheads "required in targeting the very deep, underground hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our potential adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon the green light to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, while the Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking of recommendation with current policy is hardly surprising, given the current positions of the people who contributed to the 2000 report. Nor is it surprising in light of the current situation around us. It would seem the authors of the report sat down and had a hard look at the world around us and their projections actually came true. For this very reason, Bush and his team would be well advised to accept their recommendations. One is the effect on our allies. Once we assert the unilateral right to act as the world's policeman, our allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we will be forced to spend American wealth and American blood protecting the peace while other nations redirect their wealth to such things as health care for their citizenry. That is one of the tough breaks of being the biggest kid on the block. I remember how appreciative certain Germans were when I was stationed there in the early 80s. It wasn't so much because we were protecting them from the Russians; if war had come, they'd have had to mobilize, too, else our force would have probably been overrun. But for the nonce, as one told me, "for every American in Germany, that's a German that doesn't have to get drafted." Our alternative is the same one, to let someone else to do it, while we sit around clipping our health care coupons. But when they need something, we'd better be prepared to come through. Not being a trusting soul, I'd rather see us do it ourselves. And the part about our "allies receding" is fatuous; they've already receded, and it's doubtful they'll ever be back. With the possible exception of the British, any further alliances the U.S. enters into should be, will have to be, short-term, directed toward a single objective and then reevaluated. They may remain in force for years — Britain and Portugal have been allied almost continuously for over 200 years — or we may go our separate ways when a mutually beneficial goal has been achieved. Accepting the [Gary] Cooper role would be a historic change in who we are as a nation, and in how we operate in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not campaign on such a change. It is not something that he or others have dared to discuss honestly with the American people. To the contrary, in his foreign policy debate with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a more humble foreign policy, a position calculated to appeal to voters leery of military intervention. Bush's intentions during the debate with Gore were perfectly valid. Had the nation not come under attack, had the actual situation not dramatically clarified itself, we probably would have continued under the mistaken assumptions that were in force at the time. But we were attacked. The world is a different place, and we have not only a different set of priorities now, but the citizenry has a different set of expectations. The cost of such a global commitment would be enormous. In 2000, we spent $281 billion on our military, which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003, our expenditures will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the increase in our defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more than the total amount spent annually by China, our next largest competitor. The cost of not spending the money will be higher. "Pay me now, or pay me later." The lure of empire is ancient and powerful, and over the millennia it has driven men to commit terrible crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, a global empire was essentially laid at the feet of the United States. To the chagrin of some, we did not seize it at the time, in large part because the American people have never been comfortable with themselves as a New Rome. Back in the days when people used to be educated, they saw what happened to the Roman Empire, to Byzantium, and to the Holy Roman Empire. There are perils associated with it. But as the author says, it was laid at our feet and we disdained it; now we're forced to pick it up. Too bad. And we might point out that, for all the perils associated with dominion, the Roman empire lasted almost 700 years — it was an empire while it was still a republic. The Byzantine empire lasted about the same length of time, from Constantine to the Turks. And while the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor really an empire, it hung around even longer, about 1000 years. So there are advantages to be had, too, if we do it right.Are peace and security best achieved by seeking strong alliances and international consensus, led by the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral approach, accepting and enhancing the global dominance that, according to some, history has thrust upon us? That's pretty much the debate right now, but the extent of the debate is limited by the actuality around us. Being nice and multilateral would be pleasant, and it would take a lot of work from our national shoulders. But it might not be possible. If the rest of the world won't shoulder their portion of the load, and the work has to be done, then we'll have to do it, like it or not. If we do decide to seize empire, we should make that decision knowingly, as a democracy. The price of maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue that the price of rejecting it would be higher still. So what's yer beef, Jack? |